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ABSTRACT
Data Monitoring and Analysis in Wireless Networks
By
Yongjie Cai
Advisor: Dr. Ping Ji
Various wireless network technologies have been created to meet the ever-increasing
demand for wireless access to the Internet, such as wireless local area network, cellular
network, sensor network and many more. The communication devices have transformed
from large computational servers to small wireless hand-held devices, ranging from lap-
tops, tablets, smartphones to small sensors. The advances of these wireless networks
(e.g., faster network speed) and their intensive usages result in an enormous growth of
network data in terms of volume, diversity, and complexity. All of these changes have
raised complicated issues of network measurement and management.
In the first part of this thesis, I study how WiFi network characteristics impact
network forensics investigation and home security monitoring. I first focus on network
forensics investigation and propose a wireless forensic monitoring system to collect trace
digests of WiFi activities and facilitate cybercrime investigation. Then, I design and de-
velop a low-cost home security system based on WiFi networks for physical intruder
detection. Two methods - MAC-based detection and RSSI-variance-based detection, are
proposed based on the characteristics of WiFi networks. In the second part, I study how
to effectively and efficiently model multiple coevolving time series, which is ubiquitous
in network measurement especially in wireless sensor networks. Two comprehensive al-
gorithms are proposed to address three prominent challenges of mining coevolving sensor
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Various wireless network technologies have been created to meet the ever-increasing de-
mand for wireless access to the Internet, such as wireless local area network, cellular
network, sensor network and many more. The communication devices have transformed
from large computational servers to small wireless hand-held devices, ranging from lap-
tops, tablets, smartphones to small sensors. It is reported that wireless traffic accounted
for the majority of IP traffic at 44 percent two years ago. It is expected that traffic from
wireless and mobile devices will exceed traffic from wired devices by 2018, and by then,
wired devices will account for 39 percent of IP traffic, while WiFi and mobile devices
will account for 61 percent of IP traffic [1].
With easy deployment and low costs, WiFi Network provides Internet access at
homes, university and corporate campuses, and public places such as libraries, parks, and
coffee shops. While people enjoy the convenience of connecting electronic devices, such
as laptops, tablets, smartphones, video-game consoles and digital cameras to the Internet
via wireless access points, the wireless channels are prone to different types of attacks
and subject to performance problems such as congestions and high packet losses all the
time. Therefore, monitoring network activities in wireless networks to facilitate security
and network performance management is an important area of research. In this thesis, we
study how WiFi network characteristics impact network forensics investigation and the
home security monitoring.
In the revolution of wireless networks, Sensor Network has become an important
component in data communications as well. Research papers and practical projects have
been proposed and conducted in various types of application scenarios for sensor net-
works. It ranges from networks of sensors with single and simple sensing modalities
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(e.g., temperature, air pressure, acoustic) to complicated networks of sensors that pro-
vide data of mixed modalities and continuous readings. For example, sensor networks
are deployed to monitor the concentration of dangerous gases in the cities, detect forest
fires, monitor water quality in industries, measure temperature, humidity, and light both
in industries and residential houses, etc. [14]. The sensor nodes are prone to failures, and
the topology of a sensor network might change frequently. All of these characteristics of
sensor networks make the analysis management of sensor data very challenging. In this
thesis, we formulate sensor data as coevolving multiple time series with missing values.
We identify the data characteristics of such times series and propose two comprehensive
models for pattern discovery, missing value recovery and forecasting.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 introduces two studies of
security monitoring in WiFi Networks. Then, Chapter 3 presents two effective and effi-
cient algorithms to model coevolving multiple time series generated by sensor networks.
Finally, Chapter 4 concludes this thesis and discuss future directions.
CHAPTER 2
Security Monitoring in WiFi Networks
2.1 Introduction
The 802.11 based wireless network (known as WiFi) works as a ubiquitous com-
munication infrastructure because of its capabilities of low cost, easy deployment, high
network bandwidth and its inherent convenience for mobile devices. Many places such as
university campuses, corporate and government offices, public parks, or even entire urban
cities are blanketed with Internet access through numerous access points (APs).
As wireless networks and mobile devices are claiming dominant roles in modern
communication technology, the manifestations of digital crimes have started integrating
wireless elements as well, which makes digital forensic investigation unprecedentedly
difficult. For example, a hacker may drive on the street, randomly pick an open WiFi
network, conveniently connect to the access point, upload or download malicious files
through the access point, then close the session and drive away. The whole process may
only take minutes to accomplish, and when the victim machine notices the attack, the best
point of interest that it can trace back is very likely only the benign access point, through
which the true attacker conducted the malicious activity. It is almost always certain that
the hacker will be cut loose. We propose a distributed Security Monitoring system for
Wireless network Forensics (SMoWF) to monitor Wireless LAN activities. Abstracts of
network traces are captured and selectively recorded at each monitoring point. Distributed
monitoring points collaborate to reconstruct the crime scene based on stored logs, and
the SMoWF system aims to answer an important investigation question: which device
appeared at where during what time.
While WiFi networks might be taken advantage of cyber criminals, they provide
3
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an alternative way to advance home security. We design and develop a low-cost home
security system called Beagle to detect unexpected physical intruders, prevent property
loss and keep homes safe. Unlike traditional home security systems relying on placing
sets of sensors inside the house, Beagle is based on existing WiFi infrastructures with
ubiquitous WiFi signals penetrating the walls and thus extending our sensing capability.
With all the functionalities including monitoring, detection, and alarming built into one
box, it is easy for users to deploy and use the Beagle system.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2 and 2.3, we introduce
the details of the SMoWF and Beagle systems. We review the related work in Section 2.4.
The conclusions are in Section 2.5.
2.2 SMoWF: Security Monitoring for Wireless Network Forensics
Cybercrime is an exploding security challenge in the current digital age, and has
been largely concerned by the public over the past several decades. With the escalating
deployment of WiFi networks, the accelerated usage of mobile devices, and the dynamic
physical and protocol characteristics of wireless communication, wireless links have be-
come an increasingly popular channel for cyber criminals to camouflage their true iden-
tities. For example, a malicious hacker may walk on the street, randomly pick an open
Access Point (AP) such as one from a coffee shop, conveniently connect to the AP, upload
and/or download malicious files or send commands through the AP to Zombie machines
compromised for a distributed attack, then close the communication session and take off
freely. The whole process may only take minutes to accomplish. No one would even
notice what has happened until the victim device(s) detects an intrusion. When an at-
tack has been identified, the investigators will easily run into the situation where the best
point-of-interest that can be traced back is the benign access point, through which the true
attacker conducted the malicious activity. Since most WiFi users do not regularly keep
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security logs and monitor the activities of their wireless network, it is almost certain that
the hacker is off the hook.
An intuitive way is to ask users to keep SNMP logs in APs and record partial traffic
statistics such as application workloads, and user sessions by some traditional measure-
ment methods applied on the wired part of WiFi network traffic [19,33,73,77]. However,
only limited knowledge can be obtained in the wireless part (PHY/MAC layers under IP
layer) through such wired measurement efforts. Researchers also have proposed several
wireless monitoring infrastructure systems, primarily for improving wireless channel and
protocol performance. Figure 2.1 demonstrates a framework of a typical wireless mon-
itoring system, which consists of three main components: wireless network monitoring
points, a data repository and a centric processing engine. Wireless network monitoring
points are usually deployed at some fixed locations. Each monitoring point gathers net-
work information by passively capturing traffic in the air, and transmits the gathered raw
data to the repository. The centric processing engine conducts network analysis and re-
ports events of interest to network operators. DAIR [17], Jigsaw [27] and Wit [60] are
three such systems built on this infrastructure. These two monitoring methods might
work in the organizations with network specialists, such as corporates and universities.











Figure 2.1: A typical wireless monitoring system
In this work, we propose to design a Security Monitoring system for Wireless Net-
work Forensics (SMoWF), which aims to keep trace digests of WiFi activities and to an-
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swer the important investigation question: which device appeared at where during what
time.
2.2.1 Overview of SMoWF
The emerging and increasing growth of WiFi wireless networking technology makes
it possible to connect to the Internet from anywhere at anytime. For example, in a wire-
less network measurement study [21], we conducted experiments around a three-block
metropolitan neighborhood of the upper-west side of Manhattan, and observed over 3000
access points in the neighborhood. The densely deployed WiFi networks are undoubtedly
making our life much easier and more enjoyable, but they also provide more opportunities
for malicious users to conduct criminal activities through mobile devices. We notice that
among our observed access points, about 30 percent provide unencrypted WiFi services.
In other words, these open networks can be easily compromised. In this work, we pro-
pose a security monitoring infrastructure for wireless network forensics (SMoWF), which
is to build an intelligent monitoring system that can uncover malicious devices, track their
activities in Wireless LAN of metropolitan areas, and preserve digital evidence to facili-
tate future cyber crime investigation. The SMoWF system should be able to answer the
following questions:
• Whether or not a particular device was involved in a given malicious network ac-
tivity?
• Can this device be uniquely identified by the logs?
• Where was a particular device physically located during a given event?
Similar to Figure 2.1, the SMoWF system consists of a set of monitoring points that are
responsible to capture wireless network traffic. These monitoring points are distributed
through a wireless network and may be moved around to cover Wireless LANs as much
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as possible. After the collection of raw traffic data, SMoWF parses raw data into human-
readable texts, eliminates irrelevant traffic types and extracts useful information for device
identification and localization. It also removes the payload (i.e., data part) of traffic pack-
ets to protect users’ privacy. SMoWF uses a central repository to store processed data as
digital evidence. Finally, it includes a post-investigation engine that helps investigators to
figure out what was going on when a criminal activity occurred. The post-investigation
engine retrieves relevant data from the evidence repository and is able to answer the afore-
mentioned questions.
2.2.2 Traffic Capture and Preprocess
Comparing to those monitoring systems deployed in buildings or universities [38]
[27], there are several challenges of wireless traffic monitoring in a metropolitan area:
1) the number of access points that are observable (i.e., accessible to malicious users) is
very large; 2) the locations and distributions of access points are unknown; 3) we do not
have permissions to administrate these access points. Therefore, the traditional ways of
obtaining traffic are not practical. We cannot configure all of these access points to log
their real-time traffic, nor can we deploy thousands of static stand-alone monitoring nodes
to cover the whole area.
The SMoWF system delegates the traffic capturing tasks to wireless monitoring
points, such as laptops, tablets or even smartphones, being either stationary or mobile.
These monitoring points passively capture nearby wireless network traffic, and periodi-
cally upload the encrypted or hashed traffic logs to a central repository. Particularly, in our
experiments, we use Kismet [5] installed on a MacBook Pro to gather raw wireless net-
work traffic. Kismet is a 802.11 wireless network sniffer working with any wireless card
that supports the monitoring mode, and detects networks by passively collecting network
packets. It can record GPS coordinates where packets are observed when integrated with
a GPS device. Kismet generates two important log files - pcapdump and gpsxml. All the
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packet information above the MAC layer and the Per-Packet Information (PPI) header,
such as the transmitting channel, the received signal and noise strength, are logged in
pcapdump files. GPS information such as coordinates and speed are recorded into gpsxml
files. Kismet gathers raw packets into pcapdump files and records monitoring locations
into gpsxml files. Then, tshark [12] is used to parse and extract selected fields of raw
packets into human-readable texts.
2.2.3 Evidence Preservation and Post-investigation
For evidence preservation, it is not efficient enough to reduce data storage size by
only extracting packet headers. The network traffic size can be huge compared to limited
storage capabilities. For instance, in the experiments presented in Section 2.2.4, 362,305
packets (i.e., about 311MB trace data) were collected by randomly walking around a
three-block neighborhood for 12 trips lasting around four hours. These data came from
only one single monitoring point. If tens or hundreds of monitoring points participate, it
can easily get to 10-100 GB traces in one day. For instance, Jigsaw [27] collected 96GB
802.11 raw traces in one day using 192 radio monitors.
We make statistical analysis on the packet types among the collected trace. As
Figure 2.3 in Section 2.2.4 shows, half of the packets are beacon frames sent from access
points. The beacon frames are used to claim the existence of WiFi networks and are not
related to the associated clients. Therefore, the beacon packets can be filtered out. Other
extracted information is stored into a database in order to support efficient queries and
conduct post forensics investigation.
The post-investigation component aims to answer the questions described in Sec-
tion 2.2.1, which can be summarized as device identification and device localization prob-
lems. As a preliminary work for the SMoWF system, MAC addresses are used as the
unique identifiers of mobile devices. For device localization, we study and evaluate two
localization algorithms: the weighted centroid algorithm [28] and the log-distance path
9
loss modeling method [69]. The weighted centroid algorithm simply estimates the loca-
tion of a target device as the weighted sum of all locations where it is observed, described
in Equation 2.1. p̂ is the estimated location of the target device, pi is the ith location
coordinate (xi, yi) where the device is observed, and the weight wi is proportional to the




wipi, wi ∝ si,
∑
i
wi = 1. (2.1)
The log-distance path loss modeling method describes that the average received
signal strength decreases logarithmically with the distance between the transmitter and
the receiver, shown in Equation 2.2.
si = s0 − 10γ log di +Xσ, (2.2)
where si is the received signal strength at the ith location. di is the physical distance from
the target device with coordinates (x, y) to the monitoring point with coordinates (xi, yi).
The path loss exponent γ indicates the loss rate of the received signal strength. s0 is the
received signal strength at a distance of one meter. To compensate for the random shad-
owing effects in the signal propagation, Xσ is added as a zero-mean Gaussian distributed
random variable with a standard deviation σ. Theoretically, four monitoring points or
monitoring locations are required to determine four parameters (s0, γ, x, y) of the target
device so as to infer the location coordinate (x, y). However, in practice, the target device
is observed at more than four locations, which results in a set of over-determined equa-
tions. We adopt the proposed method by Krishna et al. [29] to find solutions to minimize
the least mean absolute error of the equations. In the SMoWF system, to simplify the
implementation, the trust-region-reflective optimization approach is used to minimize the
10




(si − s0 + 10γ log di)2 (2.3)
2.2.4 Experiments and System Prototype
Trace Storage To better understand the wireless traffic in the Metropolitan area, we
Figure 2.2: Testbed and Walking Path.
conduct several war-walking experiments in a three-block metropolitan area of the upper-
west side in NYC shown in Figure 2.2, which is around 260m*260m. We use a MacBook
Pro laptop with internal airport wireless card and equipped with a BU353 GPS receiver
as a moving monitoring point. Kismet, installed on the MacBook Pro, is configured to
hop on channels to cover the entire spectrum and log all received wireless packets. We
walked around the neighborhood for 12 trips along the path of A-H or H-A in a week of
April of 2011. We collected 362,305 packets around 311MB traces.
The distribution of packet types of these traces is shown in Figure 2.3. As can be
observed, half of the packets are the beacon frames. The beacon frames are sent from
access points and do not provide information about any mobile device. They make little
contribution to forensics investigation. Therefore, the beacon packets can be left out or
11
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Observed 802.11 Packet Types.
Figure 2.4: Average Error Distances for Device Localization.
only preserved periodically. On the other hand, when a user is uploading or downloading
an image or a document or a video, there are a sequence of data packets in the session.
Several of these packets in the same session are enough for the identification and tracing
back processes. Flow or session identification techniques (e.g. sequence number) can be
used to identify the start and the end of a session, then only selected packets are preserved
in the repository as digital evidence.
Device Localization To evaluate the two localization algorithms described in Sec-
tion 2.2.3, We conduct the following experiments. Two smartphones are used as target
devices and five test locations are chosen so that devices are able to connect to nearby
WiFi networks. During the experiments, we collect the communication traces between
WiFi networks and the two smartphones via one monitoring point and approximate smart-
phones’ locations via the two algorithms. To get the ground truth of the test locations, We
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run the GPS receiver for 2 minutes statically at these locations and average the coordinate
readings as the ground truth. For each test location, We use the Haversine formula [4]
to calculate the error distances between the ground truth and estimated coordinates of the
two devices through two algorithms. As Figure 2.4 shows, the average error distances for
two devices are around 31 and 40 meters using the weighted centroid method, 44 and 87
meters using the log-distance path loss modeling approach. Hence, the SMoWF system
applies the simple but effective weighted centroid algorithm.
System Prototype As described before, a MacBook Pro laptop with built-in airport
wireless card and an external BU353 GPS receiver is used as a moving monitoring point.
It runs Kismet, which is configured to hop on channels to cover the entire spectrum.
After trace collection, raw data are parsed and selected packet fields are extracted
into our database. These fields contain frame date and time, MAC addresses including
source address, destination address, BSSID, transmitter address, and receiver address,
data length, channel frequency, received signal strength, type and subtype of 802.11, IP
source and destination addresses, source and destination port of TCP and UDP. The pay-
loads of these packets are dropped. Notice that a packet does not always include all the
fields. For example, 802.11 Acknowledgement and Clear-To-Send packets only contain
receiver MAC address and no other MAC address. One packet only has source or desti-
nation port either from TCP or UDP. Neither TCP nor UDP information can be obtained
from encryption packets. Furthermore, the location information of the monitoring points
are extracted into the database, which contains date, time, source MAC address, signal,
noise, latitude, longitude, altitude, fix, speed, heading. Indices are created on date fields
to speed up queries.
A simple web user interface is developed to demonstrate how SMoWF can help
investigators to trace back their interested device. As shown in Figure 2.5, an investigator
can enter a date and time period of an interesting event, and/or a MAC address, IP, BSSID.




Figure 2.5: System prototype.
from the database, shown in Figure 2.5(a). Meanwhile, it estimates the locations of the
tracked device with five-minute window using the weighted centroid algorithm, shown as
Figure 2.5(b). It also generates a KML file that visualize the geo locations of the device
in Google Earth, shown in Figure 2.5(c). In this way, the investigators can easily track the
locations of their interested device.
2.2.5 Summary
In this work, a wireless forensic monitoring system (SMoWF) is outlined, which
aims to establish a forensic database based on wireless trace digests, and to answer the
following investigation questions: 1. Was a particular device involved in a given malicious
network activity? 2. Can this device be uniquely identified by the logs? 3. Where a
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particular device was physically located during a given event. We conducted research and
experiments for the following tasks: 1. Design network trace logging method that records
the abstract of useful fields of network packets. Here only abstracts of packets are kept for
privacy protection purpose. 2. Design a query/search system that allows users to conduct
forensic analysis activities based on monitored traces; 3. Study localization algorithms
that can provide the location information of a given device.
2.3 Beagle: Physical Intruder Detection using WiFi networks
Home security is a big concern to everyone. Current home security systems rely on
placing various types of sensors to monitor different information about a house [39, 48].
For example, door and window sensors are installed to detect the open or close status
of doors and windows; motion sensors are placed in critical locations to detect human
movements; other monitoring sensors such as fire and smoke sensors, water sensors, tem-
perature sensors, etc. are deployed to ensure the house being kept in a good condition.
However, the installations and maintenance of such sets of sensors are very complex and
time-consuming. In addition, the cost of these home security systems is very high. Many
house owners will not buy and use these systems.
On the other hand, the use of smartphones has become an integral part of people’s
daily life. Smartphones with WiFi turned on actively send probe packets to search for
available WiFi networks. The probe packets contain MAC addresses of smartphones,
which can be an unique identification of a user. Some marketing companies and location
analytics firms such as Euclid Analytics [3] and Turnstyle Solutions [13] use MAC ad-
dresses to profile and track actual and potential shoppers and customers for stores. 100
recycling bins were installed in the city of London before the 2012 Olympics to monitor
the phones of passers-by using the same technique [10]. Similarly, Presence Orb [8] ap-
plies it to detect if buses or bars are full. Furthermore, when a person moves around the
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area of wireless networks, the signal propagations of the wireless links would be affected,
which leads to the the variation of measured received signal strength (RSS or a.k.a RSSI).
In this work, we utilize two aforementioned facts, and design a low-cost home
security system called Beagle to tackle one of the most important tasks in home security
- physical intruder detection, which aims to detect unexpected physical intruders, prevent
property loss and keep homes safe. Unlike traditional home security systems relying on
placing multiple sensors inside the house, Beagle is based on existing WiFi infrastructures
with ubiquitous WiFi signals penetrating the walls and thus extending our senses. With
all the functionalities (e.g., monitoring, detection, alarming) built into one box, it is easy
for users to deploy and use Beagle.
2.3.1 Design Considerations
In this section, we discuss some typical scenarios for physical intruder detections
in home security, and then describe how we can deal with these scenarios with the design
of Beagle. The detailed design is described in the followed sections.
Let us consider the six following typical scenarios in physical intruder detections:
1. The owner is in the house;
2. The owner has a guest in the house;
3. An unknown person passes by the house within a short time;
4. An unknown person is in the neighbor’s house;
5. An unknown person is around the house for a relatively long time.
6. An unknown person is in the house;
Intuitively, the first three cases are normal (i.e., no intruders), and happen a lot in our daily
life. For example, in the third case, neighbors or simply strangers may pass by our house
many times, but the time they stay is very short. In addition, we won’t care about whether
there are thieves in the neighbor’s house, typically, which is described as the fourth case.
Hence, the Beagle system should not alarm the user for the first four scenarios. On the
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other hand, when some unknown person is lingering around a house (i.e., Scenario 5), the
owner of the house probably will want to know that. When an intruder or a stranger is in
the house (i.e. Scenario 6), the owner definitely would like to be alarmed.
With the ubiquity of 802.11 based wireless networks, localization using wireless
signals is becoming a popular research topic. Many methods are proposed to achieve
high accuracy in positioning static or/and moving subjects. However, these methods only
focus on answering questions such as whether there is a subject and where it is. They
do not consider whether this subject is expected or not. Hence, these methods cannot be
directly applied in our scenarios.
The Beagle system is based on the residential WiFi networks to detect unexpected
physical intruders and stay armed for home security. Generally, Beagle automatically
learns and maintains a whitelist that contains users’ identifications (i.e., MAC addresses
of users’ smartphones), which is used to differentiate an authorized or known person from
a suspicious or unknown person. It further infers whether an unknown person is expected
from the presence of the house owners. Also, Beagle sets up RSSI thresholds to infer
whether the person (i.e. the target device) is in the area of interests, such as users’ house
or neighbors’ houses. Finally, Beagle combines the effects of moving people on RSSI
from multiple APs to detect the intruder entering into the house.
2.3.2 System Overview
Based on the aforementioned design considerations, the Beagle system should be
able to a) differentiate between non-intruders (e.g., friends, passers-by) and the actual
intruders, b) detect the actual physical intruders; c) send alerts to the user instantly in
b)’s condition. To accomplish these tasks, the Beagle system is designed with three main
components: Packet Capture and Information Extraction, Intruder Detection, and Alert
System.
In the packet capture and information extraction part, Beagle monitors and collects
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WiFi frames around a house by placing a WiFi monitoring point at an important loca-
tion in the house (i.e., the places that intruders will enter into, e.g., the living room, the
hallway). Meanwhile, it extracts certain significant fields such as device identifications
(i.e., MAC addresses) and received signal strengths for intruder detection. In the intruder
detection component, Beagle analyzes the obtained information, and triggers the alert
system if any intruder is detected. In the alert system, house owners will be informed
with instant message (e.g., gtalk in current implementation) upon the detection of any
intruder.
The Intruder Detection part is the key component of the Beagle system. As men-
tioned before, two facts are utilized to design and implement this component. Firstly, by
monitoring the probe packets (containing the identifications of devices - MAC addresses)
sent from nearby smartphones, any suspicious MAC address coming from a potential in-
truder can be detected, which derives a MAC-based Detection approach. Secondly, the
existence of an intruder in the house can be inferred through the impact of his/her activities
on the RSSI, which derives the design of an RSSI-variance-based Detection approach.
2.3.3 Intruder Detection
2.3.3.1 MAC-based Detection
The MAC-based detection method aims to detect intruders carrying WiFi devices.
As we described, a WiFi-enabled device actively broadcasts probe request to search avail-
able networks. The probe request packet contains the MAC addresses of the device, which
serves as an identification of the owner of the device. By looking at its received signal
strength indicator (RSSI), it is possible to infer the approximate distance of the target
device. To design the MAC-based detection method, two measurement-based studies are
conducted to answer the following critical questions:
• How can we capture the probe packets if any?
• How can we tell the target person is inside or outside a house?
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a) Study of smartphones probing behaviors
Figure 2.6: Active Scanning Procedure
Figure 2.6 demonstrates a simplified version of active scanning procedure through
probe request frames in 802.11 protocols. Generally, upon the receipt of scanning request
from operating system, a mobile device starts a probe cycle and scans its supported chan-
nels by sending out probe requests to each channel one by one. During this probe cycle, it
waits for some time (i.e., probe delay) between sending any two probes. If any response is
received, it will process the probe responses. Otherwise, it waits for the next scan request
with a randomized waiting time period.
In this procedure, many parameters (e.g., the order of the scanned channels, the
number of probes sent on each channel, and the probe delay) that would affect the packet
capture vary with device models. To learn these parameters, we conduct a probing behav-
ior study on five popular smartphone models on market, including iPhone 4S, iPhone 5
and 5S, Samsung Galaxy S5 and HTC One (M7). In the study, a sniffer is set up using a
laptop, its built-in WiFi network card and an external WiFi network card. We configure
both cards in the monitor mode, with one listening on Channel 1 and the other on Channel
11. The smartphones are set in asleep status, with the installed apps running, and WiFi
networks turned on. The monitoring and data collection procedure lasts around one hour.
After the collection, the parameters are inferred based on the fields embedded in probe
frames, such as timestamps, sequence numbers, and channels. For example, the probe
delay time can be derived by calculating the difference between the timestamps of two
adjacent probes in the same probe cycle. The number of the probes per channel can be
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Table 2.1: Study of Popular Smartphones’ Probing Behaviors.
Device Channels #Channels #Probes Per Channel Probe Delay (ms) One Probe Cycle (ms) Observed Waiting Time
iPhone 4S b/g/n 11 2 20 440 2s-43 mins
iPhone 5/5S a/b/g/n 20 1 40 800 2s-10 mins
Samsung Galaxy S5 a/b/g/n/ac 21 2 40 1620 2s-3 mins
HTC One (M7) a/b/g/n/ac 21 2 40 1620 4s-30 mins
calculated by counting the number of probes observed on the same channel in the same
probe cycle.
Table 2.1 lists the detailed results. As can be observed, all of the studied mobile
devices support channels of 802.11b/g/n. They send one or two probes in each channel.
The probe delay between two adjacent probes is around 20ms or 40ms. Hence, to ensure
the capture of the probes if there is any, we need to stay on any channel of b/g/n (i.e.,
Channel 1-11) for more than two seconds. To make things simpler, the sniffer is fixed
with one monitoring channel in the implementation.
(a) iPhone 5 (b) Samsung Galaxy 5
Figure 2.7: Regular Used Smartphones’ Waiting Times in Worst Case Scenarios.
As presented in Table 2.1, the waiting time between two probe cycles varies with
different devices. Generally, the newer model is observed having less waiting time. We
further measure the waiting times of regularly used devices in worst case scenarios.
Specifically, we check how often two of the most popular models, iPhone 5 and Sam-
sung Galaxy S5, send probes with all installed apps being closed during night time (i.e.,
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no user interaction). Figure 2.7 shows the CDF plots of their observed waiting time inter-
vals. As we can see, for iPhone5, 95% of waiting time are less than 10 minutes and 85%
of waiting time are less than 5 minutes; for Samsung Galaxy S5, 95% of waiting time are
less than 5 minutes. This result indicates that if an intruder stays longer than 5 minutes,
the success probability of the detection is very high.
b) Study of signal strength from probe frames
To answer the second question, we propose to use the received signal strengths of
probe frames to infer a target device’s coarse location. A measurement study is conducted
to explore how the RSSIs of the probes of the smartphones change in different positions
around a house. In this study, a sniffer is placed in the living room, and a few important
locations are explored with two smartphone models, iPhone 5 and Samsung Galaxy S5.
At each location, we put the smartphone in the pocket and collect about 100 probes when
we face the sniffer and turn the back to the sniffer, respectively. As it is described before,
smartphones wait for seconds to minutes to start an active scan, which would take us a
very long time to complete the measurement study. It is noticed that when the smartphone
is waked up from the asleep status, it starts an active scan immediately. Hence, we make
the smartphones switch between the awake and asleep status constantly to speed up the
measurement.
Figure 2.8: Study of signal strength from probe messages.
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Figure 2.8 shows the CDF plot of the RSSIs of Samsung Galaxy S5. The line colors
denote different places: blue means the smartphone is far away from the sniffer (around
10 meters); magenta denotes it is outside the door (around 4 meters away from the sniffer);
and the black lines are measured when the smartphone is at the door but inside the house
(around 4 meters away from the sniffer). The line types denote whether the human faces
or turns back to the sniffer. As can be observed, the RSSIs significantly decrease due to
the presence of the human body. To infer the approximate distance of the target device,
with 85% confidence, -75 is selected as a low threshold to indicate the device is far away,
and -62 is picked as a high threshold to indicate the device is close to the sniffer. Similar
results are observed with iPhone 5.
c) The proposed algorithm
Figure 2.9: MAC-based Detection: Detecting intruders carrying WiFi devices.
Figure 2.9 demonstrates a general idea of how the MAC-based detection method
works. A sniffer with the capability of monitoring WiFi networks is set up in a spot of
the house (e.g., the living room). The sniffer keeps capturing probe request frames. If the
frame is from some known MAC, or an unknown MAC address but in presence with a
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known MAC address, we infer that the detected device comes from the home owners or
their guests. If the frame is from a short-lived MAC address with very weak RSSIs, we
say that the detected person is innocent. However, if an unknown MAC address with very
strong RSSIs is observed and if no ”familiar” MAC address is accompanying it, we say
that it probably comes from an intruder.
Algorithm 1: The MAC-based Detection Algorithm
Input : PR = 〈timestamp,MAC,RSSI〉, RSSI Low,RSSI High,
lingerTime
1 if PR.MAC not in Whitelist then
/* user is not at home or current time is at night
time or user is asleep at daytime */
2 if ! isUserAtHome() or isNight() or noMovement() then








11 if PR.MAC in Probelist && The time interval from last probe










Accordingly, Algorithm 1 describes the implementation of the MAC-based detec-
tion approach. At the beginning, the MAC addresses of the house owners’ smartphones
are input, which is used to infer whether the house owners are at home (isUserAtHome()).
A night time period is set up to determine the activation of the Beagle system (isNight()).
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During the daytime, the detection is activated only when there is no movement in the
house (noMovement(), implemented based the RSSI-variance-based method). A whitelist
(Whitelist) is used to store trusted devices, and a probe list (Probelist) is used to main-
tain the MAC addresses of probes in recent half an hour. Besides, the observed probe
request is represented as a triple PR = 〈timestamp,MAC,RSSI〉. As Algorithm 1 de-
scribes, the Beagle system stays armed in the circumstances that a) the user is not home;
b) during night time; c) it is daytime but the user is asleep. In the armed status, if a device
that does not belong to the whitelist is detected with an RSSI exceeding the high RSSI
threshold (RSSI High), or it stays longer than some time (defined as lingerT ime) with
relatively high RSSI (RSSI Low ≤ PR.RSSI ≤ RSSI High), the Beagle system
would send alert to the house owner.
2.3.3.2 RSSI-variance-based Detection
As Figure 2.10 demonstrates, when an object moves around the area covered by
wireless networks, the transmissions of both line-of-sight links and non-line-of-sight links
would be affected. Both would lead to the variations of measured received signal strength
(RSS) on the links. Based on this fact, an RSSI-variance-based detection method is pro-
posed to compensate for the limitation of the MAC-based detection approach – an intruder
cannot be detected if he or she does not carry any WiFi-enabled device.
Figure 2.10: RSSI-variance-based Detection: Detecting intruders without carrying WiFi
devices.
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Plenty of research work propose state-of-arts algorithms to track and localize a
moving object based on the variance of RSSIs [79,90]. Most of them deploy a network of
sensor nodes in the monitoring area and assume an ideal environment (i.e., no other object
except the target one is in the area). It is hard to meet the above requirements in the home
environment. Instead, access points in home WiFi networks broadcast beacon frames at
a high frequency (usually one beacon frame every 100ms) to announce the presence of
WiFi networks. These access points can be regarded as radio sensors.
a) Effects of moving people on RSSI
As a first step, we study the impact of moving people on the RSSIs of beacon
frames. The experiments are set up as follows: a sniffer is placed in the living room,
one AP (AP1) is in the same room and the other AP (AP2) is in a different room (e.g., a
bedroom). Both APs and the sniffer are set in the same channel. During the experiments,
the house is left empty for around 10 minutes after the sniffer is started. Then, to simulate
an intruder’s behavior, a person enters into the house, and walks around the living room
and the room where AP2 is located.
(a) AP 1 (b) AP 2
Figure 2.11: Effects of moving people on the RSSIs of beacon frames (x axis is the time
in second, y axis is the RSSI values in dbm).
Figure 2.11 demonstrates the measured RSSIs of beacons from AP1 and AP2. It can
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be observed that the RSSIs from both APs are noisy. One set of dominant RSSIs (around
-30dbm) are observed from AP1, while two sets of dominant RSSIs (around -50dbm and
-60dbm) are observed from AP2 because of multi-path effects. In addition, it is observed
that with a moving person (i.e., around the 10th minute), the RSSIs of both APs change
significantly.
b) Characterizing RSSIs
Inspired by [90], we use short-term and long-term RSSI histograms to characterize
the observed RSSIs, and quantitate their difference with the Kullback-Leibler divergence
metrics. If the difference exceeds some threshold, we say that it is an anomaly. Mean-
while, we leverage neighbors’ APs to improve the accuracy of the intruder detection.
The RSSIs measured by commercial wireless devices are discrete values and usu-
ally range from -100dbm to 0dbm. We define a histogram of RSSIs as the frequency of
every observed values of RSSIs in a time window. Formally, we denote the RSSI ob-
served at the ith time step as yi and define a short-term and a long-term RSSI histograms
as follows. Given a smaller time window with a length Ts, a larger time window with a
length Tl and an RSSI steam y1, y2, ..., yn, the short-term histogram hs and the long-term









where I is an indicator vector and Iyi is one at the element corresponding to the RSSI
integer yi and zero at the other elements. The short-term histogram hs represents the
distribution of the RSSIs within the most recent time window with the length Ts, and the
long-term histogram hl characterizes the distribution of the RSSIs within the Tl-length
time window before the most recent Ts-length time window. Fig. 2.12 is an illustrative
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example of how the two histograms are constructed.
Figure 2.12: Short-term and long-term histograms of an RSSI stream
We choose the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) metrics to measure the differ-
ence between two histograms hs and hl, which is defined as follows:












where ε is a small number and is used to avoid divide-by-zero problems. We track the
KLD for each Ts-length window and perform anomaly detections. We use the exponen-
tially weighted moving average (EWMA) model in our system. Specifically, at each short-
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term time window t, we calculate the KLDt between two histograms, and its EWMA St
is defined as follows:
S1 = KLD1,
St = αKLDt−1 +(1− α)St−1, t > 1, (2.6)
where α is the weighting parameter and is set to 0.05 in our system. Then, we compare
KLDt to St. If KLDt > τSt, we mark KLDt is anomalous, where τ is a threshold set in
the system.
c) Leveraging neighbors’ APs
Most of houses are equipped with only one AP, which indicates a limited sensing
capability. We propose to take advantage of other APs outside the monitored house such
as neighbors’ APs to expand the sensing area. One problem is that we have to differentiate
whether an anomaly from a neighboring AP is from an intruder or activities outside the
house (e.g., a neighbor’s walking affect the signal propagation of the AP in his house).
We propose to leverage multiple neighboring APs to determine the anomalous source, as
follows:
• If an anomaly is seen from the home AP, we consider it as an anomaly event;
• If only a single anomaly is seen from one of neighboring APs, we ignore such event;
• If two or more anomalous signals are from neighboring APs, we consider it as an
anomaly event.
To reduce false positive alerts further, we send an alert upon seeing at least two anomaly
events in the past certain time.
2.3.4 System Prototype
As a prototype, we implement the Beagle system on a HP laptop with a built-in
wireless network interface card (NIC) and an external wireless NIC (Alfa AWUS036H).
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Scenario True Positive True Negative
The intruder is crossing the link between home AP and sniffer X
The intruder is not crossing the link between home AP and sniffer X
The intruder is outside the door for a long time X
A neighbor is walking inside his house X
Someone is passing by X
Table 2.2: Test Scenarios for the Beagle’s Prototype
The built-in wireless NIC is set to monitor in the channel that is used by the home AP. The
external wireless NIC chooses a different channel, by sampling all supported channels
excluding the channel already monitored and selecting the channel that has the largest
number of neighboring APs with good connection quality (i.e., with over 60% packet
reception rate).
There is an observation time window after the Beagle system is initially launched.
During this window, it adds devices connected to the home AP to the whitelist and profiles
the long-term histograms for the home and neighboring APs. Then, it starts the intruder
detection component. In the prototype, we aggregate the functionality of the hangout (or
a.k.a gtalk in previous versions) as an instant alerting method.
We test our system prototype with five scenarios listed in Table 2.2. The scenarios
are simulated in a setting of three adjacent conference rooms shown in Fig. 2.13. Table 2.2
shows the results.
Figure 2.13: Test Environment for the Beagle’s Prototype
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2.3.5 Summary
In this work, we propose a low-cost home security system based on the existing
WiFi infrastructures to detect unexpected physical intruders. Specifically, we propose two
approaches - the MAC-based detection approach and the RSSI-variance-based detection
approach to detect intruders with/without WiFi devices. Our system achieves reasonable
performance in five common scenarios.
2.4 Related Work
2.4.1 WiFi Monitoring
There are a number of wireless traffic capture tools [15], such as Wireshark, Tcp-
dump and Kismet/KisMac. These tools enable us to gather wireless network traces
through ”off-the-shelf” 802.11 network interface cards. When a 802.11 network card
is set in the promiscuous mode, the traffic within the same network can be captured .
When the card is set in the monitor mode, no packet is transmitted through it and the
traffic transmitted in the channel that the card works in can be preserved. In addition,
Kismet [5] is able to hop channels to cover the entire spectrum, and record the physical
monitoring location when it is equipped with a GPS receiver. The collected packets con-
tain vital clues for future forensic investigations, such as the SSIDs, MAC addresses and
associated clients of wireless networks in range.
Researchers have proposed several wireless monitoring infrastructure systems, pri-
marily for improving wireless channel and protocol performance. VISUM [38] delegates
the monitoring task to a set of distributed agents using SNMP. It uses device-specific XML
profiles to map retrieved high-level monitoring information to device-specific SNMP Ob-
ject Identifiers. It consists of a centric processing engine, which is responsible to assign
individual agents to monitor subsets of network devices. This would a very complicated
task when the number of monitored devices gets very large, and things can get worse when
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the locations of these devices are unknown. Along this line of research, DAIR [17] is a
framework that manages and troubleshoots enterprise wireless networks using desktop
infrastructures. It proposes to attach USB-based wireless adapters to desktop machines,
which usually have spare CPU and disk resources, and more reliable wired-line Internet
connectivities. These inexpensive adapters then work as monitoring points and can be
densely deployed to cover an entire local area. Jigsaw [27] deploys 192 stand-alone radio
sniffers to monitor a wireless network that consists of 40 open APs, which cover four
floors and a basement in a building. The three aforementioned systems are designed for
network administrators to better monitor and diagnose the network performance of 802.11
networks. They mainly focus on maintaining the stability of clients connectivity, reducing
the interference and packet delay. The infrastructures of DAIR and Jigsaw usually work in
the indoor environment with a limited sensing area. Another related work is FLUX [62],
which is a prototype of forensic monitoring system based on CoMo platform [41]. It
aims to identify suspicious activities, network anomalies and provide incident playback.
However, FLUX was in its preliminary stage and seemed discontinued.
2.4.2 Device Identification
Another aspect related to our SMoWF system is device identification. Malicious
attackers can easily camouflage their device IDs. MAC spoofing is a typical example
for simple and effective anonymity tactics. Attackers can change the MAC address of
their devices easily. However, in recent years, researchers have proposed quite a few
ways to fight against MAC spoofing. Jeffery et al. demonstrate that 64% of users can
be identified with 90% accuracy from implicit identifiers from users’ network activities,
which include pairs of the IP Address and port, SSID probes, broadcast packet sizes and
MAC protocol fields [65]. Dolatshahi et al. show the effectiveness of using RF signature
as a wireless device identity [32, 67]. They exploited the imperfection of commercially
used RF transmitters and amplifiers, which is difficult for attackers to modify. Polak
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et al. propose to analyze the in-band distortion and the spectral growth to uncover the
more sophisticated attackers who distorted their signatures [68]. In the prototype of the
SMoWF system, we use the MAC address as the device identifier without worrying too
much about MAC spoofing problem.
2.4.3 RF-based Device Localization
The related RF-based device localization can be categorized into two groups ac-
cording to their purposes. One is to device-self localization, in which a person carries
with a radio device and the device estimates its location by radio signals; and the other is
device-free localization, in which a target person is localized without carrying any radio
device.
2.4.3.1 RF-based Device-self Localization
The RF-based device-self localization methods assume the target carries a radio
device that transmits wireless signals periodically. They aim to map the received signal
strength (RSS) of the radio device to physical location coordinates. One group of the
algorithms build a radio frequency map by dense measurements so that each position has
a unique signal fingerprint. Typically, a fingerprint of a position is defined by a set of
received signal strength from nearby transmitters (e.g., access points for WiFi devices).
When a new fingerprint is arrived, some statistical algorithms are applied to determine
the locations of the fingerprint [18, 52, 59, 72, 87]. For example, RADAR [18] used the
K nearest neighbor method to find the best fit for the location of a given fingerprint. The
Horus system [87] estimates the device location of a given fingerprint as the one with the
maximum probability in the RF map.
The fingerprinting methods involve massive human labor to build the RF map,
which may also introduce human errors. An alternative way for localization is to adopt
radio signal strength models [18] [29]. The log-distance path loss model is a commonly
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used model, which describes the energy level of the received signal strength decreases
with the increasing distance between the transmitter and the receiver [69]. Theoretically,
with over three instances of received signal strengths, the location of the transmitter can
be determined using triangulation [29]. The challenge is that it is difficult to accurately
model the propagation path of radios due to the multi-path and shadowing problems. In
reality, many physical obstacles such as buildings, trees, walls, etc., exist during radio
transmission. The radio would reflect, diffract and refract on these objects.
2.4.3.2 RF-based Device-free Passive Localization
RF-based device-free passive localization does not require the target to wear a radio
device. It utilizes the fact that the presence of people or objects will affect the RF signal
propagation. Youssef et al. first coined the term Device-free Passive (DfP) localization,
and introduced an architecture of the DfP system and the challenges [88]. Many recent
state-of-arts DfP localization models are proposed in the context of wireless sensor net-
works [26, 79, 80, 89, 90]. For example, Wilson et al. deployed thirty-four sensor nodes
outside a residential house and proposed a variance-based radio tomographic imaging sys-
tem to track people walking inside the house [80]. Similarly, Zhao et al. proposed a kernel
distance-based radio tomographic localization system to track stationary and moving peo-
ple and evaluated their system with a wireless sensor network comprised by thirty-four
sensor nodes [90]. Xu et al. introduced a fingerprinting-based DfP localization method
using probabilistic classification approaches to localize a subject, and extended it with a
conditional random field model to support localization for multiple subjects. They vali-
dated their methods in multiple experimental settings with over eight radio transmitters
and eight radio receivers [83].
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2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we studied the impact of WiFi network characteristics on network
forensics and home security monitoring. Our major contributions are
• we outlined a wireless forensic monitoring system (SMoWF), which collects trace
digests of WiFi activities and aims to facilitate cybercrime investigations.
• we studied and evaluated device localization algorithms in the SMoWF system.
• we designed and prototyped a low-cost home security system (Beagle) based on
WiFi networks for the physical intruder detection.
• based on the characteristics of WiFi networks, we proposed two methods - MAC-
based detection and RSSI-variance-based detection - to detect intruders with/with-
out carrying WiFi devices.
CHAPTER 3
Imputation and Prediction for Coevolving Time Series
Most network measurement collect data over time, which are organized as a sequence of
observed data points called time series. Time series analysis has naturally become an es-
sential component in measurement studies. The main goal is to unveil the hidden patterns
of time series so as to recover missing values, forecast future trends, detect anomalies,
etc.
Time series analysis (a.k.a time series data mining) has been a very active research
area in the past decade. It has posed many fascinating research questions. Among oth-
ers, three prominent challenges shared by a variety of real applications are (a) high-order;
(b) contextual constraints and (c) temporal smoothness. The state-of-the-art mining algo-
rithms are rich in addressing each of these challenges, but relatively short of comprehen-
siveness in attacking the coexistence of multiple or even all of these three challenges.
In this chapter, we first focus on multiple coevolving time series, and propose a
dynamic contextual matrix factorization method to solve the latter two challenges. Then,
we extend it to the FACETS algorithm based on tensor factorization to tackle all the chal-
lenges. We present our experimental evaluations on several real datasets, including room
condition monitoring via sensor networks, chlorine concentration level measurement in
water distribution systems, traffic monitoring in a vehicle-to-vehicle network. We show
that both of our methods (1) outperform the state-of-the-art algorithms in terms of two





Mining time series data has been a very active research area in the past decade,
exactly because of its prevalence in many high-impact applications, ranging from envi-
ronmental monitoring, intelligent transportation systems, computer network forensics, to
smart buildings and many more. It has posed many fascinating research questions. We
identify and summarize three prominent challenges as follows:
C1 High-order. Multiple time series arising from real applications are often collected
from multiple locations with multiple types (See Fig. 3.1(a) for an example). Yet,
many classic time series analysis tools, such as Kalman filtering, often fall short in
modeling such multi-aspect, high-order time series data.
C2 Contextual constraints. Many real time series data is accompanied by contextual
information (e.g., the sensor network in Fig. 3.1(b)). How to effectively leverage
such contextual information remains an open question for time series data mining.
C3 Temporal smoothness. This refers to the correlation among the adjacent obser-
vations along the temporal dimension (e.g., the smooth curves in Fig. 3.1(b)(c)).
Despite its key importance for some data mining tasks (e.g., imputation and predic-
tion), temporal smoothness is often ignored in certain time series mining algorithms
(e.g., the standard matrix/tensor decomposition), which have been increasingly at-
tracting attention in the recent years.
Fig. 3.1 is an illustrative example of such time series. The time series data are
generated from a set of sensors deployed in a smart building shown as the right subfigure
of Fig. 3.1(b). Each sensor generates multiple time series by measuring certain types of
room condition (e.g., temperature, humidity, etc.) over time. As shown in Fig. 3.1(a), the
time series data can be viewed as a cube, in which sensor, measure type, and time step


























































(b) a sensor-time slice
in temperature dimension
(c) a type-time slice from one sensor
(a)
Figure 3.1: An illustrative example of high-order time series with rich contextual net-
works.
by selecting one measurement type (e.g., temperature in the figure), we get a sensor-
time slice that consists of multiple temperature time series from the sensor network. The
weight labeled on network edge indicates the similarity between the connected nodes. We
use the same color to represent time series and its corresponding network node. It is clear
that the time series in the sensor-time slice are connected with each other by underlying
sensor network (contextual constraints). We refer to such multiple time series, together
with its embedded network as a network of time series. Similarly, if we extract a type-
time slice from one sensor (another example of a network of time series), we can also
find the time series of multiple types are essentially connected by the type network shown
in Fig. 3.1(c). Specifically, temperature, light, voltage have similar daily patterns, while
humidity shows a trend inverse to those of others. From time series figures, we can
observe the strong correlation between two adjacent data points in temporal dimensions,
which is an essential characteristics in time series - temporal smoothness.
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In this chapter, we take two steps to solve all the aforementioned challenges. We
first focus on modeling a network of time series, where we adopt the concept of collab-
orative filtering that multiple coevolving time series and/or the contextual network are
determined by a few latent factors and encode temporal smoothness with linear dynami-
cal systems. We propose a dynamic contextual matrix factorization algorithm (DCMF) to
simultaneously find the common latent factor in both the input time series and its embed-
ded network. Then, we formulate high-order time series as tensors and adapt the tensor
decomposition method to extend DCMF for fast comprehensive mining of co-evolving
high-order time series (FACETS).
Most parts of this chapter are published in [22, 23].
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, we briefly intro-
duce the background of time series data mining. In Section 3.3, we formally define the
problems of a network of time series (NoT) and its extension (Net-HiTs). We present the
proposed methods and experimental results in Section 3.4 and 3.5. The related work is
reviewed in Section 3.6, followed by the conclusions in Section 3.7.
3.2 Background
In this section, we will briefly introduce basic notations of time series and some
common tasks of time series analysis in wireless network measurement, followed by a
review of frequently used models and approaches in the existing literatures. More detailed
reviews can be found in [31, 34, 44].
3.2.1 Notations and Tasks
A time series is a sequence of data points measured at equal time intervals. We use a
matrix Xn×T to represent time series with n dimensions and T time steps. Data collected
in network measurement often can been organized as time series, such as the hourly-
aggregated traffic volumes generated by mobile devices, the daily download counts of
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applications in an app store, the daily active subscriber numbers of a website, etc.
Time series analysis analyze time series data using various methods mainly includ-
ing statistical, machine learning/data mining models to discover the underlying patterns.
It has a variety of tasks, ranging from prediction, clustering, classification, anomaly de-
tection, segmentation and many more. Plenty of research work has been done on one or
several of these tasks.
Prediction Time series data are usually considered smooth, which indicates the depen-
dency between subsequent data points. The task of prediction is to model such depen-
dency explicitly or implicitly to predict the next few values. Approaches for time series
prediction include simple/weighted moving average, linear regression, Kalman Filtering,
Markov Chain, etc.
Clustering The task of clustering is to group a set of objects so that objects in the same
group are more similar to each other than to those in other groups based on distance
or similarity metrics. These resulted groups are called clusters. The objects can be the
whole/partial time series, or recurring patterns extracted from time series. In time se-
ries clustering, it first defines a distance or similarity metrics, e.g., Euclidean distance,
dynamic time warping, longest common subsequence. Then it applies clustering ap-
proaches, such as k-means, hierarchical clustering, density-based clustering, etc.
Classification The task of classification is to build a classification model based on a
labelled training dataset and then use the model to assign a label to unlabelled time series.
In time series classification, it builds features from training dataset first, and then apply
classification algorithms, such as SVM, k-NN, neural networks, regression and decision
trees, to the feature set.
Anomaly Detection Anomaly detection is to find whether a newly observed data points
or subsequence of time series is normal to a training dataset. Time series in the training
dataset are assumed to share similar (normal) behaviors. The way to anomaly detection is
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to model the normal behaviors of training time series and then to find subsequences that
are too far from the model as anomalies. It is worth noting that methods in the prediction
task can be used for anomaly detection. If we can predict next values of time series with
a large accuracy, we can compare the newly coming time series with the predicted values,
and detect anomalies very naturally.
Segmentation The segmentation task is to divide time series into a sequence of discrete
segments and to characterize the dynamics within each segment. Segmentation can be
achieved through change-point detection, piecewise linear regression, Hidden Markov
Model, etc.
3.2.2 Models and Approaches in Time Series Analysis
Many time series analysis techniques have been proposed to characterize the es-
sential properties of time series data with different aspects of considerations, including
the accuracy of shape characterization, the computational cost, the reduction ratio of data
dimensionality, the reconstruction error from the reduction, etc.
Piecewise Linear Approximation (PLA) approximates a time series with several
connected straight lines, which can significantly reduce the data storage and make data
computation more efficient. PLA is also widely used for segmentation. A review of the
common methods of PLA can been found at [47].
The discrete Fourier transform (DFT) method maps time series data from time do-
main to frequency domain. It is often used for similarity search. By taking only first few
Fourier coefficients for indexing, DFT can significantly reduce the search space and speed
up the search [16]. The discrete wavelet transform (DWT) has been found to be more ef-
ficient and effective comparing to DFT [25]. DWT captures both temporal and frequency
information, while only frequencies are included in DFT. A comparison between DFT
and DWT can be found in [64] and [81].
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) or Principle Component Analysis (PCA) [43]
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is usually applied to identify and extract the most significant components. Given a time
series matrix Xn×T , SVD factorizes it as:
X = UΣV′,
where U is an n× n orthonormal matrix and V′ is a T×T orthonormal matrix, and Σ is an
n×T diagonal matrix and contains singular values. SVD has a variety of applications. For
example, by checking the dominant singular values in Σ, we can identify the dominant
components among X’s rows and among X’s columns. By only selecting a subset of
largest singular values, we can approximate X with a low-rank matrix.
PCA aims to find the most significant components by finding the most meaningful
basis for a dataset. Generally, given a time series matrix Xn×T , PCA computes the first
principle basis w1 such that X’s projections (called the first principle component) on w1
will minimize the sum-of-squared residuals:
w1 = arg min
||w||=1
ΣTt=1||Xt −ww′Xt||2, (3.1)
where ′ denotes transpose and ww′Xt is the reconstruction of Xt. Then PCA sequentially
computes the next principle basis wk(k = 2, 3, ...) on the residuals.
X̂ = X− Σk−1r=1wkw′kX, (3.2)
wk = arg min
||w||=1
ΣTt=1||X̂t −ww′X̂t||2. (3.3)
We usually only choose top l(l  n) principle basis, which gives a low-rank projection
of X.
There are also a group of models that generalizes PCA or SVD to work on higher
order datasets, such as tucker decomposition [78], canonical/parrallel-factors (CP) de-
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Figure 3.2: A State Space Model
composition [24, 37], and multilinear PCA [57].
State space models are very common in time series analysis. Fig. 3.2 illustrates
the graphical structure of a state space model. A latent variable zt is introduced for each
observation xt. zt can be in different dimensionality with xt. The latent variables form
a Markov chain and each observation is conditioned on the state of the corresponding
latent variable. If the latent variables are discrete, it is known as hidden Markov model
(HMM). If both the latent and observed variables are linearly dependent on the states of
their parents in the graph, it becomes linear dynamical system (LDS) [20].
Other models proposed to represent time series include Piecewise Approximate Ag-
gregation (PAA) [45,86], Adaptive Piecewise Constant Approximation (APCA) [46], the
Symbolic Aggregate approXimation (SAX) [55, 56] and indexable Symbolic Aggregate
approXimation (iSAX) [74].
3.3 Problem Definition
Table 3.1 lists the main symbols we use throughout this chapter. Following the
standard notations, we use calligraphic style letters for tensors (e.g., A), bold uppercase
letters for matrices (e.g., A), bold lowercase letters for vectors (e.g. a). We denote the
transpose of a matrix with a prime (i.e., A′ is the transpose of A). We use superscripts
to denote the size of matrices/vectors (e.g., An×l means a matrix of size n × l). When
the size of a matrix or a vector is clear from the context, we ignore such subscripts for
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Table 3.1: Symbols and Definitions
Symbol Definition and Description
A,... tensors (calligraphic style)
A,... matrices (bold upper case)
Aij the element at the ith row and the jth column of matrix A
Aj,A.j the jth column of matrix A
Ai. the ith row of matrix A
A′ transpose of matrix A
a,b, ... column vectors (bold lower case)
 element-wise multiplication
⊗ kronecker product
X/X observed time series matrix/tensor
Xt/Xt time series at time step t
W/W indicator matrix/tensor
S/S contextual matrix/matrix set
S = S(1), ...,S(M)
Z/Z time series latent matrix/tensor
B/B transition matrix/tensor
U/U object latent matrix/tensor
V/V contextual latent matrix/matrix set
V = V(1), ...,V(M)
n number of objects in X and S
T length of time series
l dimension of latent variables
M order of Xt
Nm dimensions of X andW on mode m
Lm dimensions of latent variables on mode m
vec(X ) vectorization of tensor X
mat(X ) matricization of tensor X
X(n) mode-n matricization of tensor X
brevity. We use subscripts to represent the elements in a matrix, e.g., Aij is the element at
the ith row and the jth column of the matrix A, A.j (or Aj for brevity) is the jth column
of A, Ai. is the ith row of A. We use  to denote the element-wise multiplication and ⊗
to denote the kronecker product.
Besides the standard notations, in the problem of a network of time series, we use a
matrix Xn×T to denote time series with n dimensions and T time steps, where Xit denotes
the data from ith object at time t. Correspondingly, we use an indicator matrix Wn×T to
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indicate whether data is observed or missing in X, i.e., Wit = 0 when Xit is missing,
otherwise Wit = 1. We use a contextual matrix Sn×n to represent the embedded network.
When we generalize the problem with high-order time series, we use a (M + 1)-
order1 tensor X ∈ RN1×...×NM×T to denote high-order time series, where Nm(1 ≤ m ≤
M) is the dimension of themth mode and the last mode of the time series tensor represents
the temporal mode with T dimensions (i.e., the time series has T time steps). We can also
rewrite the time series tensor as a sequence of M -order tensors X1,X2...,XT , where each
Xt ∈ RN1×...×NM (1 ≤ t ≤ T ) denotes the observed data at tth time step. Similarly, we use
an indicator tensorW ∈ RN1×...×NM×T to indicate whether a single entry inX is observed
or missing. Specifically, Wn1...nM t = 0 if Xn1...nM t is missing, otherwiseWn1...nM t = 1.
Besides, we have a set of contextual matrices S = {S(1),S(2), ...,S(M)}, where each
S(m) ∈ RNm×Nm(1 ≤ m ≤ M) represents the contextual network of X ’s m mode and
each entry of S(m) indicates the correlations of the corresponding two dimensions in the
m mode.
Note that the n-dimensional time series matrix X can be seen as a special case of
the time series tensor X with M equals one. The indicator matrix W can be seen as a
special case of the indicator tensorW with M equals one. Consequently, the contextual
matrices set S of X is reduced to one contextual network S of X.
3.3.1 A Network of Time Series
With the above notations, a Network of Time Series (NoT) can be formally defined
as follows:
Definition 3.3.1. A Network of Time Series (NoT). Given an n dimensional partially ob-
served time series with T time steps Xn×T , an indicator matrix Wn×T , an n×n contextual
matrix Sn×n representing the network behind X, and a one-to-one mapping function ζ ,
1In this chapter, order and mode are interchangeable.
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which maps each dimension of the time series X to a node in S, a Network of Time Series
is defined as the quadrupletR = 〈X,W,S, ζ〉.
The problem of time series missing value recovery can be defined as follows:
Problem 3.3.1. NoT Missing Value Recovery.
Given: a network of time seriesR = 〈X,W,S, ζ〉;
Recover: its missing parts indicated by the indicator matrix W.
3.3.2 A Network of High-order Time Series
A Network of High-order Time Series (Net-HiTs) can be formally defined as
follows:
Definition 3.3.2. A Network of High-order Time Series (Net-HiTs).
A Network of High-order Time Series is defined as a quadruplet R = 〈X ,W ,S, ζ〉,
where X ∈ RN1×...×NM×T is a partially observed (M + 1)-order time series tensor,W ∈
RN1×...×NM×T is an (M + 1)-order indicator tensor, T in both tensors represents the
dimensionality of the time mode, S contains a set of contextual matrices, which represent
the correlations between any two dimensions in each mode of X . And ζ is a one-to-one
mapping function, which maps each dimension of the time series X to a node in S.
Accordingly, the problem of time series missing value recovery and prediction can
be defined as follows:
Problem 3.3.2. Net-HiTs Missing Value Recovery.
Given: a network of High-order time seriesR = 〈X ,W ,S, ζ〉;
Recover: its missing parts indicated by the indicator tensorW .
Problem 3.3.3. Net-HiTs Prediction.
Given: a network of High-order time series R = 〈X ,W ,S, ζ〉, and time step of predic-
tion t;
Predict: t time steps after X .
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3.4 NoT: a Network of Time Series
3.4.1 Dynamic Contextual Matrix Factorization
In this section, we present our solution for NoT Missing Value Recovery prob-
lem (Problem 3.3.3). We start with the discussions of some baseline solutions and their
limitations, followed by our formulation to encode the temporal smoothness and the cor-
responding algorithm.
3.4.1.1 Preliminaries and Challenges
We would like to point out that Problem 3.3.3 bears some similarity to the classic
collaborative filtering problem. To be specific, if we treat the rows (time series) and the
columns (time steps) of X as users and items, respectively; the observed entries in X
as the ‘ratings’ between the corresponding users and items; and the contextual matrix S
as the ‘social network’ among different users, Problem 3.3.3 can be viewed as inferring
the missing or unknown ratings between the users (rows of X) and the items (columns
of X). Having this in mind, it seems that many collaborative filtering methods can be
used to solve Problem 3.3.3. For example, if we only use the partially observed time
series matrix X, we can use the matrix factorization based collaborative filtering (Baseline
Solution 3.4.1) [51,63]. If we further incorporate the contextual matrix S, it is essentially
a social recommendation problem (Baseline Solution 3.4.2) [42, 58].
Baseline Solution 3.4.1. Collaborative Filtering (via Matrix Factorization)
Given: a rank size l, and a rating matrix Xn×m with missing values indicated by Wn×m,
where Xij denotes user i’s rating on item j and Xij = 0 if there is no rating,
Find: user latent factor Un×l and item latent factor Zl×m such that X ≈ W  (UZ).
The rating predictions are estimated as the non-zero values of X̃n×m, where X̃ = (1 −
W) (UZ).
Baseline Solution 3.4.2. Social Collaborative Filtering (via joint matrix factorization).
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Given: a rank size l, and a rating matrix Xn×m with missing values indicated by Wn×m,
where Xij denotes user i’s rating on item j and Xij = 0 if there is no rating; a social
network matrix Sn×n, where Sij indicates how much user i trust or is influenced by user
j,
Find: a user latent factor Un×l, an item latent factor Zl×m and a social latent factor
Vl×n such that X ≈W  (UZ) and S ≈ UV. The rating predictions are estimated as
the non-zero values of X̃n×m, where X̃ = (1−W) (UZ).
Baseline Solution 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 can be represented by the graphical models shown
in Figure 3.3(a) and 3.3(b). Both solutions are to find the similarities between users
indicated by the user latent factor U. Baseline Solution 3.4.1 only uses the rating matrix,
while Baseline Solution 3.4.2 fuses the rating matrix with the social matrix and finds the
user latent factor shared by both matrices. In many multiple time series applications, we
can also find such similarities between these time series. For example, in time series
obtained from a sensor network, nearby sensors may collect similar measurements; in a
water quality dataset, the chlorine concentration levels of two connected pipes can be very
close.
However, in both Baseline Solution 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, the temporal smoothness, a
unique characteristic of time series data, is ignored. For instance, the sensor data (e.g.,
temperature, light, humidity) or the chlorine concentration levels collected in two con-
secutive time steps might not change a lot. Ignoring such temporal smoothness is likely
to lead to sub-optimal or even infeasible solutions of Problem 3.3.3. For example, both
Baseline Solution 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 would fail if a certain number of columns of X are
missing entirely.
3.4.1.2 Proposed Formulation
We propose a novel algorithm, Dynamic Contextual Matrix Factorization (DCMF),
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(c) Dynamic Contextual Matrix Factorization
Figure 3.3: Comparison between the baseline solutions (a and b) and the proposed for-
mulation (c).
To model the temporal smoothness, we first re-write the time series X as column
vectors (x1,x2, ...,xT ), where each xt represents n dimensional data at time t; and the
corresponding hidden factors Z as (z1, z2, ..., zT ). Then we define zt to be linear to zt−1
with a transition process B and multivariate transition noise ωt ∼ N (0,Λ). The state
for the latent variable at the first time step z1 is defined by z0 with multivariate Gaussian
noise ω0 ∼ N (0,Ψ0):
z1 = z0 + ω0, zt = Bzt−1 + ωt, (3.4)
Similar to the joint matrix factorization model, we define xt to be linear to zt
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through the latent factor U with multivariate Gaussian noise εt ∼ N (0,Σ), sj to be
linear to vj through the latent factor U with multivariate Gaussian noise τj ∼ N (0,Ξ):
xt = Wt  (Uzt + εt), (3.5)
sj = Uvj + τj. (3.6)
We also place zero-mean spherical Gaussian priors on V under the assumption that each





In order to accommodate our model in sparse time series datasets, we simplify the
multivariate Gaussian noises by assuming that the transition noises and observation noises
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), and the covariances of latent variable
{vj} are i.i.d., i.e. vj ∼ N (0, σ2V ), and
ωt ∼ N (0, σ2Z), εt ∼ N (0, σ2X), τj ∼ N (0, σ2S),
where t = 1, ..., T and j = 1, ..., n.
With Eq. (3.25)-(3.23) and the parameters θ = {B, z0,Ψ0, σ2Z , σ2X , σ2S, σ2V }, our






















where we omit the model parameters in the equation.
3.4.1.3 Proposed Algorithm
In Eq. (3.28), U and zt jointly determine xt, and U and vj jointly determine S. Due
to such coupling, it is difficult to find its global optimal solution. Hence, we aim to find
its local optimal instead, by grouping {zt,vj} and updating U and {zt,vj} alternatively.
Regarding U as a parameter of the model, the solution of our model contains parameters
θ = {U,B, z0,Ψ0, σ2Z , σ2X , σ2S, σ2V } and the latent factors {zt}, {vj}.
To be specific, we adopt the expectation-maximization (E-M) algorithm to find a
local optimal solution of our model as follows. We first randomly set the initial values of
the parameters θold, then iteratively perform E-M steps until the convergence criterion is
satisfied. In the E step, we infer the posteriors of the latent variables {zt}, {vj} based on
the old parameters θold. In the M step, we update the new parameters θnew that maximize
the expectation of the distribution likelihood.
A1. E Step: updating the latent factors
Given U, {zt,xt} are independent with {vj, sj}. We can estimate the posteriors of {zt}
and {vj} independently w.r.t. U (steps 3-12 in Algorithm 2).
Eq. (3.25) and (3.20) are very similar to linear dynamic systems, except that only
observed entries in xt contribute to Eq. (3.28). Let ot denote the indices of the observed
entries of xt, and x∗t denote the observed entries of xt, which is a compressed version of
xt, we use Ht to represent the corresponding compressed version of U. Formally, ot, x∗t
and Ht can be formulated as:
ot = {i|Wit > 0, i = 1, ..., n},
x∗t = xt(ot), Ht = U(ot, :) (3.9)
x∗t = Htzt + εt
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Then, we can apply the forward-backward algorithm [20] or Kalman Filter and RTS
smoother [70, 76] to find the posteriors of the latent variables {zt}. Define
p(zt|x1, ...,xt) = N (zt|µt,Ψt),
p(zt|x1, ...,xT ) = N (zt|µ̂t, Ψ̂t). (3.10)
By using the forwarding algorithm, we have:














with the initial status:













By applying the backward algorithm, we have:
µ̂t = µt + Jt(µ̂t+1 −Bµt)





E[ztz′t−1] = Ψ̂tJ′t−1 + µ̂tµ̂
′
t−1
E[ztz′t] = Ψ̂t + µ̂tµ̂
′
t (3.14)
Then, we apply Bayes’ theorem on Eq. (3.22)-(3.23) to obtain the posteriors p(vj|sj) =
N (vj|νj,Υ):
νj = M




M = U′U + σ−2V σ
2
SI
E[vj] = νj, E[vjv′j] = Υ + νjν ′j. (3.15)
A2. M Step: updating the model parameters
In the M step, we update the parameters to maximize the expectation of the log likelihood




Q(θ, θold) = EZ,V|θold [ln p(Z,X,V,S|θ)], (3.16)
where p(Z,X,V,S|θ) is defined as Eq. (3.28).
To obtain θnew, we substitute the probabilities in Eq. (3.28) with the defined dis-
tributions, and calculate the derivatives of Q(θ, θold) w.r.t. each parameter, and then set
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each derivative to zero to get a new parameter estimation. The parameters are updated as
follows (The detailed derivations are omitted for brevity):
znew0 = E[z1]
































































where λ is to trade off the contributions of the contextual matrix and time series. With
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Unew, σ2S and σ
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i=1 Wit is the number of the observed entries in X and H
new
t is derived
from Unew based on Eq. (3.9).
A3. The Overall Algorithm
Putting everything together, we have the overall algorithm (DCMF) to solve Eq. (3.28),
which is summarized in Algorithm 2. Given a network of time series R, the dimen-
sion of latent factors l, and the weight of contextual information λ, the algorithm aims
to tune model parameters and approximate the values of the latent factors. It first ran-
domly initializes the model parameters θ (including U) (step 1); and then iteratively in-
fers the expectations of Z, V (step 3-8), and updates the model parameters θ (step 13)
until convergence. The missing values can be inferred from the reconstructed time series
X̂ (step 16).
3.4.2 Analysis of The Algorithm
In this section, we analyze the proposed DCMF algorithm in terms of its effective-
ness, complexity and relationship with the existing methods.
3.4.2.1 Effectiveness
In terms of effectiveness, our DCMF algorithm finds a local optimal solution for the
model (Eq. (3.28)), following the standard EM algorithm procedure [20]. In the E step,
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Algorithm 2: Dynamic Contextual Matrix Factorization (DCMF)
Input : a network of time seriesR = 〈X,W,S, ζ〉,
dimension of latent factors l,
weight of contextual information λ
Output: θ, Z,V
1 Initialize θ = {U, B, z0,Ψ0, σ2Z , σ2X , σ2S, σ2V };
2 repeat
3 for t=1:T do
4 Construct Ht based on Eq. (3.9);
5 Estimate µt,Ψt using Eq. (3.11),(3.12)
6 end
7 for t=T:1 do
8 Estimate µ̂t, Ψ̂t, E[ztz′t−1],E[ztz′t] using Eq. (3.13), (3.14)
9 end
10 for j=1:n do
11 Estimate E[vj],E[vjv′j] using Eq. (3.15)
12 end
13 Update θ by Eq. (3.17) - (3.19)
14 until convergence;
15 Set Z = (µ̂1, ..., µ̂T ), V = (ν1, ...,νT )
16 Reconstructed X̂ = UZ
we find the maximized posteriors of the latent factors Z and V with θold fixed. In the M
step, we update θ so as to maximize the expectation of the complete-data log-likelihood
Q with the derived distributions of Z and V in the E step.
3.4.2.2 Time Complexity
The time complexity for the algorithm is summarized in Lemma 3.4.1, where nt






t ) is upper
bounded by n3T . Also, in reality, we often have that the length (T ) of the time series is
orders of magnitude larger than the number of the time series (n) (See the data description
in Section 3.5.3 for some examples). Thus, the actual running time of our DCMF algo-
rithm is dominated by those terms related to the length of the time series T , all of which
are linear in T .
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Table 3.2: Time Complexity of DCMF
Variable Dimension Time Complexity #
Ht nt × l O(lnt + n) T
Pt−1,Jt,Ψ̂t l × l O(l3) T
Kt l × nt O(l2nt + ln2t + n3t ) T
µt l × 1 O(lnt + l2) T
Ψt l × l O(l2nt + l3) T
µ̂t l × 1 O(l2) T
E[ztz′t−1] l × l O(l3) T
E[ztz′t] l × l O(l2) T
M l × l O(l2n) 1
Υ l × l O(l3) 1
νj l × 1 O(ln) n
E[vjv′j] l × l O(l2) n








z0 l × 1 O(l) 1
Ψ0 l × l O(l2) 1
B l × l O(l3 + l2T ) 1
σ2Z 1 O(l
3 + l2T ) 1
Ui 1× l O(l2n+ l2T ) n
σ2V 1 O(ln) 1
σ2S 1 O(ln
2) 1


















Proof. For clarity, we list the time complexity of the variables calculated in the E-M
steps in Table 3.2. In some cases, we use associativity to reduce the time complexity, e.g.,
computing H(Bµt) instead of HBµt, M−1(U′sj) instead of M−1U′sj .
The forward algorithm first constructs Ht, then calculates Pt−1, Kt, µt, and Ψt









The backward algorithm updates Jt, Ψ̂t, µ̂t, E[ztz′t−1], and E[ztz′t], resulting in O(l3T ).
Then, it takes O(ln2) to compute the variables related to the posteriors of V, including
M, Υ, νj and E[vjv′j], where j is from 1 to n. Therefore, the total time complexity of the







t )). Similarly, according to Table 3.2, the




t ). Thus, the time complexity of






t )) and the overall time complexity of the
algorithm is O(#iterations · (l2nT + l2n2 +∑t(ln2t + n3t ))).
3.4.2.3 Space Complexity
The space complexity of the proposed algorithm is summarized in Lemma 3.4.2.
Lemma 3.4.2. The space complexity of the DCMF algorithm is O(nT + l2T +n2 + l2n).
Proof. The space complexity for the variables involved in the algorithm are listed in Ta-
ble 3.3. It is straight-forward to get Lemma 3.4.2.
Table 3.3: Space Complexity of DCMF
Variable Space Complexity #
X O(nT ) 1
S O(n2) 1
Z O(lT ) 1
V O(ln) 1
µt, µ̂t O(l) T

















Overall space complexity: O(nT + l2T + n2 + l2n)
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3.4.2.4 Model Comprehension
Our model in Eq. (3.28) is comprehensive in the sense that it simultaneously cap-
tures (1) the correlation among different time series; (2) the contextual information en-
coded by the contextual matrix; and (3) the temporal smoothness along the time dimen-
sion. As such, our DCMF algorithm includes several existing methods as its special cases,
including
1 Kalman filter and smoother. If we exclude the contextual matrix by setting λ to
0, and data in X are all fully observed, our model degenerates to the traditional
Kalman filter and smoother.
2 DynaMMo [54]. Our model is similar to DynaMMo if we set λ to 0. We should
point out that in this case, both models can deal with missing values, but in different
ways. Our model infers the missing values directly from the observed values, while
DynaMMo fills in the missing values using linear interpolation (or other methods)
first, then apply Kalman filter and smoother to adjust the filled missing values. As
we will show in Section 3.5.3, DynaMMo would not work well in sparse time series
since the artificial (probably incorrect) data can mislead the optimization process.
3 SoRec [58]. If we remove temporal smoothness by setting B to 0 and Λ to Ψ0, and
add zero-mean spherical Gaussian priors on U, our model becomes SoRec.
4 PMF [63]. For SoRec, if we further remove the contextual matrix by setting λ to 0,
our model reduces to PMF.
5 SmoothSoRec and SmoothPMF. Both SoRec and PMF can naturally encode the
temporal smoothness by requiring the distribution of zt to be Gaussian with zt−1




In this section, we present the empirical evaluations on real datasets, which are
designed to answer the following two questions:
• Effectiveness: how accurate is the proposed DCMF algorithm in terms of recovering
the missing values of the input time series?
• Efficiency: how does the proposed DCMF algorithm scale w.r.t. the size of the input
time series?
3.4.3.1 Experimental Setup
A. Baseline Methods. We compare our method with the following state-of-the-art algo-
rithms: Probabilistic Matrix Factorization (PMF) [63], Social Recommendation (SoRec) [58],
SmoothPMF, SmoothSoRec, and DynaMMo [54]. We also compare DMF, which is a
simplified version of DCMF with λ = 0.
B. Datasets. We use the following three real datasets in our experiments.
Motes Dataset The Motes dataset consists of temperature measurement from the
sensors deployed at the Intel Berkeley Research Lab over a month [6]. The dataset also
contains the locations of the sensors (i.e., x-y coordinates) and the averaged connectivity
probabilities (i.e., the probabilities of messages from a sensor successfully reaching the
other) over time.
Let dij and cij be the two-dimensional Euclidean distance and the connectivity prob-
ability between Sensor i and Sensor j, respectively, we define each entry of the contextual
matrix S as follows:
Sij = α · (1− dij/max
i,j
(dij)) + (1− α) · cij,
where α controls the contributions of the two parts. We set it to be 0.5 in the experiments.
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Chlorine Dataset The Chlorine dataset was generated by EPANET-2 [2], which
simulates the hydraulic and chemical phenomena within drinking water distribution sys-
tems. Given a network as input, EPANET-2 tracks the flow of water in each pipe, the
pressure at each node, the height of water in each tank, and the concentration of a chemi-
cal species throughout the network during a simulation period. This dataset contains time
series of the chlorine concentration levels from 166 pipe junctions during 15 days with a
total of 4310 time steps. Since no network structure data is published in this dataset, we
use the cosine similarity between each pair of time series to define the contextual matrix
S.
Motion Capture Dataset This dataset contains a set of full body motions using 41
markers placed on human bodies [7]. In each motion, it records three-dimensional co-
ordinates of each marker, resulting in a total of 123 features of marker positions. Each
motion consists of 200 to 1500 frames (i.e. time steps).
We define the contextual information based on the positions (x, y, z coordinates) of
the markers. Let d(i, j) be the three-dimensional Euclidean distance between the markers
of the ith feature and jth feature, Sij is defined as:







where α is set to be 1 if i and j correspond to the same dimension, and 0.5 otherwise.






where Xit is the observed value and X̂it is the corresponding reconstructed value, and W
is the indicator matrix. Wit = 1 indicates that Xit is an observed value (or is selected in
the training set), and Wit = 0 indicates that Xit is a missing value (or is selected in the
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(a) impact of l (n = 123)



















(b) impact of λ
Figure 3.4: Parameter sensitivity results of the DCMF algorithm.
test set).
3.4.3.2 Sensitivity Results
Our algorithm has two hyper-parameters: l and λ. l is the dimension of the latent
factors . Figure 3.4(a) shows the impact of l on the training parts and test parts of a
running instance in the Motion Capture dataset. As we can see, the training RMSE is
constantly decreasing as l increases, while the test RMSE achieves the lowest value when
l reaches to 15 and stabilizes after that with a slight increase. Based on that, we set l = 15
for the Motion Capture dataset. With similar experiments, we set l = 5 for the Motes
dataset, and l = 15 for the Chlorine dataset.
λ balances the information from the contextual network S and time series X. If
λ = 0, S is ignored. If λ = 1, only S is considered for learning U. Figure 3.4(b) shows
the impact of λ on the Motes dataset. As we can see, the performance is quite stable
when the training set of X contains sufficient information. But when it is very sparse
(i.e., 99.95% missing values), the introduction of S significantly improves the accuracy.
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3.4.3.3 Effectiveness Results
To evaluate all the algorithms, we incrementally generate training and test sets of the
Motes and Chlorine datasets with an increasing amount of test data (1%, 10%, ..., 99.9%)
within time series. For example, to increase the size of test set from 1% to 10%, we
randomly move 9% of the observed data from the training set to the test set. In this way,
the subsequent test set always contains the test data of the previous one.











































(b) Chlorine (n=166, T=4310)
Figure 3.5: Evaluation on missing value recovery. Lower is better. DCMF outperforms
all of the competitors.
Figure 3.5 shows the results on the Motes and the Chlorine datasets. We can see
that our DCMF algorithm consistently outperforms the other methods, especially when
the percentage of the missing values is large.
Table 3.4: RMSE for 10% (the same setting as dynaMMo [54]) missing values on the
Motion Capture dataset (l = 15, n = 123). Notice that DMF is a simplified version of
our DCMF algorithm.
Motion Running Mawashi geri Jump distance Wave hello Football throw Boxing
T 145 1472 547 299 1091 773
DCMF 3.82 2.21×101 1.31×101 6.49 3.18×101 1.21×101
DMF 3.82 2.20×101 1.31×101 6.49 3.18×101 1.21×101
dynaMMo 4.65 3.33×101 2.69×101 1.97×101 4.09×101 2.19×101
SmoothSoRec 1.31×101 2.69×101 1.67×101 8.23 3.08×101 1.38×101
SmoothPMF 1.94×101 2.24×101 1.53×101 9.64 3.05×101 1.23×101
SoRec 1.59×101 3.48×101 1.80×101 1.67×101 3.66×101 1.68×101
PMF 2.06×101 2.62×101 1.82×101 1.22×101 3.10×101 1.74×101
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As for the Motion Capture dataset, the missing values often occur consecutively [54].
Thus, we randomly choose some frame windows and mask all the values within these
windows as test sets. Table 3.4 summarizes the result of missing value reconstruction
errors on 6 motion instances. Again, our method DCMF and its simplified version DMF
significantly outperform others in most cases.
MARKER PLACEMENT GUIDE
     
     
The marker placement in this document is only one of many possible combinations.  T his 
guide will only show the standard marker placement that’s being used in the motion 
capture laboratory.  The marker placement in this guide resembles the one that is shown 
and explained in the Vicon 512 manual.  As such, the Vicon 512 Manual can offer 
additional information.  The difference with the marker set in this document from the 
Vicon 512 Manual is the addition of 4 m arkers, namely RARM, L ARM, RLEG, a nd 
LLEG. 
Before starting, below are some general rules of thumb one should follow:
• Have the person who’s going to be motion captured wear tight fitt ing clot hes—strap 
down any areas of the clothing that is loose.   The marker balls’ posit ion should move 
as lit tle as poss ible and should be properly seen.
• Place the marker balls as close to the bone as possible.  T his follows t he rule of 
having the marker balls stay stationary during movement.
(a) Marker Postions2




















































Figure 3.6: A running instance on Marker LWRB.
Figure 3.6 demonstrates a case study when most of the data of a marker are missing.
Specifically, we hide the data of Marker LWRB from frame 13 to 142. The original data
are shown as the dashed black lines in Figure 3.6(b)(c). The lines in red, blue, and purple
are the reconstructed traces using DCMF, DMF and dynaMMo, respectively. As we can
2http://mocap.cs.cmu.edu/
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see, both DCMF and DMF lead to very good approximations of the missing values. We
further examined the latent factor U derived by DCMF, and found that the three closest
markers in terms of the latent vector Ui. are RWRB, RWRA and LWRA. This is consistent
with their positions on the human body (See Figure 3.6(a)).
3.4.3.4 Efficiency Results
We test the scalability of the DCMF algorithm on a number of subsets of the Motes
dataset and the Chlorine dataset with 10% missing values. As Figure 3.15(a) shows, our
proposed DCMF algorithm scales linearly w.r.t. the sequence length T , which is consis-
tent with our complexity analysis in section 3.4.2. Figure 3.15(b) demonstrates that with
10% missing values the running time of DCMF is close to linear w.r.t. the number of
objects n.















































Figure 3.7: Scalability of DCMF.
3.5 Net-HiTs: a Network of High-order Time Series
In this section, we extend our DCMF algorithm and propose the FACETS algorithm
for mining coevolving high-order time series. We introduce preliminaries of multilinear




We introduce some definitions and lemmas in multilinear algebra (also known as
tensor algebra or multilinear analysis) from the tensor related literatures [50, 71].
Definition 3.5.1. Vectorization.
The vectorization of an M -order tensor X ∈ RN1×...×NM vec(X ) is obtained by iterating
elements of X . vec(X ) ∈ RN1...NM .
The ordering of the elements does not matter as long as it is consistent. In this
paper, we follow matlab linear indexing of multidimensional arrays to order the element.







Let the ordered setsR = {r1, ..., rL} and C = {c1, ..., cN} be a partitioning of the modes
{1,2,...,M}, the matricization of a tensor X ∈ RN1×...×NM can be specified by
X(R×C:N1×...×NM ) ∈ RJ×K with J =
∏
n∈R


















Given a tensor X ∈ RN1×...×NM×L1×...×LM , we partition the first half of modes
{N1, ..., NM} as rows and the second half {L1, ..., LM} as columns. The element of the











A special case is mode-n matricizing, which happens when R is a singleton. For
example, given an M -order tensor X ∈ RN1×...×NM , the mode-n matricizing X(n) ∈
RNn×
∏
i 6=nNi , i.e.,R = {n}, C = {1, 2..., n− 1, n+ 1, ...,M}.
Definition 3.5.3. Product or Contracted Product.
Given two tensors U ∈ RN1×...×NM×L1×...×LM and Z ∈ RL1×...×LM , the product or the




X ∈ RN1×...×NM .
Definition 3.5.4. Tensor Factorization.
Given a tensor U ∈ RN1×...×NM×L1×...×LM , the factorization of U is to decompose it into






can also be written as mat(U) = U(M) ⊗U(M−1) ⊗ ...⊗U(1).
With the above definitions, we can easily prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.5.1. Given two tensors U ∈ RN1×...×NM×L1×...×LM and Z ∈ RL1×...×LM ,
let X = U ~ Z , then vec(X ) = mat(U) vec(Z). If U is factorizable with matrices
{U(m)}Mm=1, then vec(X ) = [U(M) ⊗U(M−1) ⊗ ...⊗U(1)] vec(Z).
Lemma 3.5.2. Given two tensors U ∈ RN1×...×NM×L1×...×LM , Z ∈ RL1×...×LM , and
mat(U) = U(M) ⊗U(M−1) ⊗ ...⊗U(1)
X = U ~ Z ⇔
X(n) = U
(n)Z(n)(U
(M) ⊗ ...⊗U(n+1) ⊗U(n−1) ⊗ ...⊗U(1))′
In addition, we introduce a lemma of matrix normal distribution [36] and the defi-
nition of tensor normal distribution [71]:
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Lemma 3.5.3. Matrix Normal Distribution.
Given a matrix X ∈ RN×P , X follows the matrix normal distributionMN (M,U,V) if
and only if vec(X) ∼ N (vec(M),V ⊗U), where M ∈ RN×P ,U ∈ RN×N ,V ∈ RP×P .
Definition 3.5.5. Tensor Normal Distribution.
Given a tensor X ∈ RN1×...×NM , X follows tensor normal distribution N (U ,R) if
vec(X ) ∼ N (vec(U),mat(R)), where U ∈ RN1×...×NM andR ∈ RN1×...×NM×N1×...×NM .
3.5.2 Proposed Approach: Facets
In this section, we present our proposed FACETS for fast comprehensive mining of
coevolving high-order time series. We give the formal formulation of the model and then
provide the detailed algorithm to learn the model.
3.5.2.1 Our Optimization Formulation
In order to collectively address all the three challenges outlined in the introduction,
we present a regularization optimization formulation from the dynamic graphical model
perspective.
Step 1 - Addressing both C1 and C2. FACETS adopts the tensor decomposition model
to find the latent factors for multiple high-order (C1) input time series data. It further
encodes the contextual information (C2) to encourage the similar time series to share
similar latent factors.
Formally, let X1, X2 ..., XT be an M -order time series, S = {S(1),S(2), ...,S(M)}
be a set of contextual matrices, where each S(m) represents the contextual network of
X ’s m mode, we define the conditional distribution of Xt to be a multilinear Gaussian
distribution with the mean as the product of two latent factors U ~ Zt and the covari-
ance R, which is formulated in Eq. (3.20). U is further factorized into M factor matri-





















Figure 3.8: Step 1 - Addressing both C1 and C2
among the dimensions of the mth mode. Each column of the mth contextual matrix S(m)j
is defined with a conditional linear Gaussian distribution with the covariance Ξ(m) and the
mean as the multiplication of the two latent factors U(m) and v(m)j , presented in Eq. (3.22).
In Eq. (3.23), we define zero-mean spherical Gaussian priors on V(m), with S(m) scaled
to [−1, 1].
Xt|Zt,U ∼ N (U ~ Zt,R) , (3.20)
mat(U) = U(M) ⊗U(M−1) ⊗ ...⊗U(1), (3.21)
S
(m)










j ∼ N (0,Γ(m)), (3.23)
j = 1, ..., Nm;m = 1, ...,M.
Fig. 3.8 illustrates this step in the case of M = 3, where we omit V(m) for simplicity.
Step 2 - Addressing C3. FACETS encodes temporal smoothness with multilinear dynam-
ical systems [71]. Specifically, we define the conditional distribution of the latent factor
Zt as a multilinear Gaussian distribution with the multilinear transition tensor B and the
covariance O; B is also defined as factorizable; the state of Z1 is generated based on the
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tensor normal distribution with the mean of Z0 and the covariance of O0:
Z1 ∼ N (Z0,O0) , (3.24)
Zt|Zt−1 ∼ N (B ~ Zt−1,O) . (3.25)
mat(B) = B(M) ⊗B(M−1) ⊗ ...⊗B(1). (3.26)
In addition, since time series with missing values occurs a lot in real applications,
Eq. (3.20) will not work. Hence, we modify it in FACETS as follows:
X ∗t |Zt,U ∼ N (U∗ ~ Zt,R∗) , (3.27)
where X ∗t represent observed entries of Xt (i.e., the corresponding entries inWt equal 1.),
which is a subset of Xt. U∗,R∗ are the subsets of U and R, corresponding to the entries
of X ∗t .
Z1 Z2 Zt 1 Zt Zt+1




Figure 3.9: Graphical Model of FACETS. The blue solid box is a plate representation of
M instances, of which only a single instance is shown explicitly. The dashed rectangle
indicates that V(m) and S(m) can be skipped in the model.
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Our goal is to estimate the model parameters θ = {B,Z0,O0,O,R, {Ξ(m)}, {Γ(m)}}





























j |v(m)j ,U(m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
C2. contextual information
, (3.28)
where we omit the model parameters in the equation.
The complete graphical model of FACETS is shown in Fig. 3.9. The dashed rectan-
gle means that V(m) and S(m) can be ignored if the contextual matrix S(m) are unavailable
or inapplicable. In this model, we define a weight vector λ ∈ RM to control the contribu-
tions of contextual matrices. The contextual matrix of the mth mode is ignored if λm is
set as zero.
In order to accommodate our model in sparse time series datasets, we simplify the
covariances by assuming that the transition noise and the observation noise are indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), and the covariances of latent variable {V(m)j } are
i.i.d., and thus simplify the covariances Ξ(m),R,O,O0 and Γ(m) to (ξ(m))2, σ2R, σ2O, σ20
and σ2V m, respectively.
3.5.2.2 Proposed Optimization Algorithm
It is difficult to find the global optimal solution of Eq. (3.28) due to three couplings
in the model: a) both the parameters and the latent factors are required to learn; b) the
latent factors U and Z jointly determine X , and U(m) and V(m) jointly determine S(m);
c) U is determined by U(1), U(2),..., and U(M) jointly, and so is B. Hence, we aim to find
its local optimum instead using the expectation-maximization (E-M) algorithm. Specifi-
cally, FACETS employs the following steps to address the aforementioned difficulties: a)
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FACETS searches a local optimal solution by updating the parameter θ and the expecta-
tions of Z ,V(m) alternatively; b) it regards U as a model parameter and learns it in the
parameter updating step; c) FACETS iteratively updates U(m) and B(m) when keeping
other factors of U and B fixed.
Inferring latent factors Z , V(m). We perform vectorization and matricization
following Eq. (3.29). As each Xt,Zt is reshaped into a vector, we can easily apply the
forward and backward algorithms to get the expectations of the latent factors as in the
DCMF algorithm.
vec(Z1) ∼ N (vec(Z0),mat(O0)) ,
vec(Zt)| vec(Zt−1) ∼ N (mat(B) vec(Zt−1),mat(O)) ,
vec(Xt)| vec(Zt) ∼ N (mat(U) vec(Zt),mat(R)) (3.29)
Updating non-multilinear parameters. In this step, we maximize the expectation




Q(θ, θold) = EZ,{V(m)}|θold
[
ln p(X ,S,Z, {V(m)}, |θ)
]
, (3.30)
where θ = {U ,B,Z0, σ2O, σ20, σ2R, {(ξ(m))2}, {σ2Vm}}, and p(X ,S,Z, {V(m)}|θ) is de-
fined in Eq. (3.28).
With the expectations obtained in the latent factor inferring step, the model param-
eters, except for the factors of the multilinear operators U and B, can be derived by taking
the derivative of Q(θ, θold) w.r.t. each parameter, and setting the derivative to zero. The










































































[vec(X ∗t )′ vec(X ∗t )
+ tr (mat(U)∗E [vec(Zt) vec(Zt)′] (mat(U)∗)′)
−2 vec(X ∗t )′mat(U)∗E[vec(Zt)]] (3.31)
Updating multilinear operators. The new estimations of mat(U) and mat(B)
can be derived following the similar steps of updating other parameters, but it cannot
determine the factors of U and B. We apply the following steps to obtain a closed-form
solution for B(m) and U (m), by keeping other factors fixed.
Based on Lemma 3.5.1-3.5.3, we can get
Zt|Zt−1 ∼ N
(
B ~ Zt−1, σ2OI
)
(3.32)













where F = (B(M) ⊗ ... ⊗ B(m+1) ⊗ B(m−1)... ⊗ B(1))′, Zt,(m) denotes mode-m matri-
cizing of Zt and I/I denote the identify tensor/matrix. Then, we can rewrite p(Zt|Zt−1)
with p(Zt,(m)|Zt−1,(m)) in Eq. (3.30) and obtain the derivative w.r.t. B(m). By setting the
















where E[(Zt−1,(m)Fj)(Zt−1,(m)Fj)′] and E[(Zt,(m))j(Zt−1,(m)Fj)′] are calculated from the
expectations and the covariances of the latent factors. Specifically,
E[(Zt,(m))j(Zt−1,(m)Fj)′] = cov(Zt,(m))j, (Zt−1,(m)Fj)′)
+E[(Zt,(m))j]F ′jE[Zt−1,(m)]′ (3.34)





where cov(Zt,(m)),Zt−1,(m)) is obtained as follows: 1) revert the inferred cov(vec(Zt), vec(Zt−1))
to the tensor form; 2) permute the order of the mode from [1, 2, ..., 2M ] to [n, 1, ..., n −
1, n + 1, ...,M, n + M, 1 + M, ..., n − 1 + M,n + 1 + M, ..., 2M ]; 3) reshape the re-
ordered covariance tensor by keeping the first and (M + 1)th mode fixed and concate-
nating data from the 2nd to M th modes into one mode, and data from the (M + 2)th to
(2M)th modes into another mode, and get four-order cov(Zt,(m)),Zt−1,(m)). We can per-
form similar operations to construct E[(Zt,(m))] from E[vec(Zt)], cov(Zt,(m),Zt,(m)) from
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cov(vec(Zt), vec(Zt)).
E[(Zt−1,(m)Fj)(Zt−1,(m)Fj)′] = cov(Zt−1,(m)Fj, (Zt−1,(m)Fj)′)
+ E[(Zt−1,(m))]FjF ′jE[Zt−1,(m)]′ (3.36)







We can also get transformations for U(m) based on Lemma 3.5.1-3.5.3, shown in
Eq. (3.38). Since we only include the observed data in the learning process, we ignore
the entries of time series without available data indicated by Wt,(m). Consequently, we
update each row U(m)i. as Eq. (3.39).
















(m))2 + (1− λm)A12/σ2R
































where λm represents the contextual weight of mode m and E[Zt,(m)Gj(Zt,(m)Gj)′] can be
obtained in the similar way of calculating E[(Zt−1,(m)Fj)(Zt−1,(m)Fj)′] .
The Overall Algorithm Putting everything together, we have the overall algorithm
(FACETS) to get a local optimal solution of maximizing the log likelihood of Eq. (3.28),
which is summarized in Algorithm 3. Given a network of high-order time series R, the
dimensions of latent factors L ∈ RM , and the contextual weight vector λ ∈ RM , the
algorithm aims to approximate the latent factors U ,Z,V and other model parameters in
θ.
The FACETS algorithm first randomly initializes the model parameters θ (step 1)
and obtains the order number and the dimensionality of each order of Xt (step 2). Then it
performs matricizations of X ,W , which are iteratively used in the E-M steps. It also cal-
culates the expectations of V(m) before the first iteration (step 3-10). Then the algorithm
alternatively updates the parameters and the latent factors until the convergence. In one
repetition, it conducts M iterations to update each B(m) and U(m) while keeping other
B(n) and U(n)(n 6= m) fixed (step 13-21). Specifically, it iteratively infers the expecta-
tions and the covariances of vectorized Z , including E[vec(Zt)],E[(vec(Zt) vec(Zt)′],
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E[(vec(Zt) vec(Zt−1)′], cov(vec(Zt), vec(Zt)), and cov(vec(Zt), vec(Zt−1)) (step 14).
Afterwards, it updates the model parameters (step 15-17). Finally, it updates the ex-
pectations related to V(m) if λm > 0 (step 18-20) before next iteration.
Algorithm 3: FACETS
Input : tensor time seriesR = 〈X ,W ,S, ζ〉,
dimension of latent factors L
weight of contextual information λ
Output: θ = {U ,B,Z0, σ2O, σ20, σ2R, {(ξ(m))2}, {σ2Vm}},
E[Z],E[V ]
1 Initialize θ;
2 M←Xt’s mode; N← dimensions of Xt;
3 Matricize X ,W along time mode to obtain X,W;
4 for m =1:M do
5 Matricize each Xt,Wt to obtain Xt,(m),Wt,(m);
6 if λm > 0 then
7 for j=1:Nm do










13 for m = 1:M do
14 Infer the expectations and covariances of vectorized latent factors;
15 With Eq. (3.31), update: a)Z0, σ2O, σ20, σ2R; b)(ξ(m))2, σ2Vm if λm > 0;
16 Reshape cov(vec(Zt), vec(Zt−1)), cov(vec(Zt), vec(Zt)) and
E[vec(Zt)] to cov(Zt,(m),Z′t−1,(m)), cov(Zt,(m),Z′t,(m)) and E[Zt,(m)],
respectively;
17 Update B(m) and U(m) by Eq. (3.33) - (3.39);
18 if λm > 0 then




Time Complexity The time complexity of the proposed algorithm is summarized
in Lemma 3.5.4.
Lemma 3.5.4. Given a network of high-order time seriesR that consists ofX ∈ RN1×,...,×NM×T ,
W ∈ RN1×,...,×NM×T , and S = {S(1),S(2), ...,S(M)}, where each S(m) ∈ RNm×Nm
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(1 ≤ m ≤M), the contextual weight λ ∈ RM and the hidden latent dimensions L ∈ RM ,
the time complexity of the FACETS algorithm is upper bounded by








m=1 Lm, n =
∏M
m=1Nm.
Proof. Let nt denote the number of the observed entries of Xt. In each iteration, the
time complexity of caluculating the expectations of V(m) (Step 18-20 in Algorithm 3)
is O(LmN2m) if λm > 0 and otherwise it is 0 . The time complexity of {V(m)}Mm=1 is




m). It requires O(l








infer the expectations and covariance of vec(Z), which is upper bounded by O(n3T ). It
takes O(l2T + LmN2m) to update the parameters in Eq. (3.31), O(l
2
∏
i 6=mNiT + nlT +
L2mN
2
m) to update U
(m) and O(l2
∏
i 6=m LiT ) to update B
(m), which is upper bounded by
O(l2nT + L2mN
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In practice, the length (T ) of the time series is often orders of magnitude larger than
the number of the time series (n). Hence, the actual running time of FACETS is dominated
by the term related to the length of the time series T , which is linear in T .
3.5.2.3 Data Mining Applications
Our proposed FACETS captures the dynamics and contextual correlations based on
the observed time series data, it naturally fits in the tasks of imputation and forecasting.
Other data mining applications where our algorithm can be conveniently applied include
denoising, anomaly detection and time series clustering. We omit the details for the lim-
ited space.
A1 - Imputation. With the output of the FACETS algorithm, the vectorized version of the
reconstructed time series X̂ can be estimated by vec(X̂t) = mat(U)E[vec(Zt)]. Since
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vectorizing each Xt is the same with mode-n matricizing of X on time mode, we can
write the sequence of vec(X̂t), (t = 1, ..., T ) as X̂. With the same notations, we have
W by vectorizing each Wt. The missing values can be inferred from the non-zeros in
(1−W) X̂.
A2 - Prediction. Given the learned parameter θ and the inferred Ẑt, we can predict Ẑt+1
and X̂t+1 using Ẑt+1 = B ~ Ẑt and X̂t+1 = U ~ Ẑt+1. Furthermore, once the real
measurement dataXt+1 is arrived at (t+1)th time step, FACETS updates Ẑt+1 according to
Eq. (3.11) to improve the accuracy of predicting the latter time series. Note that FACETS
can naturally deal with the missing value existing in the newly arriving time series data.
3.5.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we present the empirical evaluations on three real datasets, which
are designed to answer the following two questions:
• Effectiveness: how accurate is the proposed FACETS algorithm in terms of imputa-
tion and prediction of time series?
• Efficiency: how does the proposed FACETS algorithm scale w.r.t. the size of the
input time series?
3.5.3.1 Experimental Setup
A. Baseline Methods. We compare our method with the following state-of-the-art algo-
rithms: Probabilistic Matrix Factorization (PMF) [63], Social Recommendation (SoRec) [58],
SmoothPMF and SmoothSoRec. SmoothPMF and SmoothSoRec are improved algo-
rithms of PMF and SoRec, which encode temporal smoothness by adding regularizations
on two consecutive temporal latent factors [22]. We also compare with DCMF, which is
a special case of our FACETS model when M = 1.
B. Datasets. We use the following three real datasets in our experiments.
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SST Dataset The Sea-Surface Temperature (SST) dataset consists of hourly temper-
ature measurements from a 5-by-6 grid of sea-surface located from 5◦N , 180◦W to 5◦S,
110◦W [11]. The measurement started from 7:00PM on 4/26/94 to 3:00AM on 7/19/94,
a total of 2000 time steps. Since no network structure data is available, we perform matri-
ciztions on each mode and construct contextual matrices based on the cosine similarity of
each pair of time series. In the experimental evaluations, we set the dimensions of latent
factors as L = [3, 3] for this dataset by default.
Motes Dataset The Motes dataset consists of multiple types of room conditions
including temperature, humidity, light and voltage measured from 54 sensors deployed
at the Intel Berkeley Research Lab over a month [6]. Because some of the baselines
are very slow, we evaluate all the algorithms on the first-day measurement data, with a
total of 2880 time steps. Besides, the dataset contains some sensor network informa-
tion including the locations of the sensors and the averaged connectivity probabilities
from one sensor to another. We define the contextual matrix on the sensor mode as:
Sij = (1− dij/max
i,j
(dij))/2 + cij/2, where dij and cij are the Euclidean distance and the
connectivity probability between Sensor i and Sensor j, respectively. Since there are only
four dimensions in the type mode, we set the corresponding contextual weight as zero.
By default, we set the dimensions of latent factors as L = [15, 3] in the evaluations.
SPMD Dataset The Safety Pilot Model Deployment (SPMD) datasets were col-
lected to understand the potential safety benefits of connected vehicle safety technolo-
gies. It consists of multimodal and multidimensional traffic data mostly within the test
site of Ann Arbor, Michigan [9]. The available one-day sample datasets contain moni-
tored vehicle trajectory traces collected on April 11, 2013, including a total of 369 trips
and 124 vehicles ranging from passenger cars, trucks to buses. The trip duration ranges
from seconds to hours with an average around 10 to 20 mins. Thus, we select the trips
whose duration is no less than 20 mins as the first order of time series, resulting in a total
of 52 trips. We take the departure time of each trip as the first time step. Two-dimensional
79


















(a) impact of L






















(b) impact of λ
Figure 3.10: Parameter sensitivity results of the FACETS algorithm.
location coordinates are sampled every one second within 20 mins time duration, result-
ing in a total of 1200 time steps. Theoretically, if we have sufficient trips, we can learn
a contextual matrix based on drivers’ behaviors. In our evaluations, with only one-day
data available, we define a trip contextual matrix based on the cosine similarity of the
trajectories of the trips. We didn’t define and count the contextual matrix in the location
mode, since practically the longitudes and the latitudes are not necessary correlated. In
the evaluations, we set the dimensions of latent factors as L = [30, 2] by default.
C. Evaluation Metrics. For the convenience of the computation, we perform matri-
cization on the observed and estimated time series tensors, and calculate the root mean
squared error (RMSE) to evaluate the effectiveness.
3.5.3.2 Sensitivity Results
Our algorithm has two hyper-parameters: L and λ. L is the dimensionality of the
latent factors . Figure 3.10(a) shows the impact of L on the training parts and test parts
of the Motes dataset. As we can see, the training RMSE is constantly decreasing as L
increases, while the test RMSE achieves the lowest value when L reaches to [15, 3] and
stabilizes after that with a slight increase.
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λ balances the information from the contextual network and time series. If λ = 0,
the contextual information is ignored. If λ = 1, only contextual information is considered
for learning U . Figure 3.10(b) shows the impact of λ on the Motes dataset. As we can
see, the performance is quite stable when the training set of time series contains sufficient
information. But when it is very sparse (i.e., 99.95% missing values), the introduction of
contextual networks significantly improves the accuracy.
3.5.3.3 Effectiveness Results
To evaluate the effectiveness of the algorithms in terms of missing value recovery,
we incrementally generate training and test sets with an increasing amount of test data
(1%, 10%, ..., 99.9%) within time series. For example, to increase the size of test set from
1% to 10%, we randomly move 9% of the observed data from the training set to the test
set. As a result, the subsequent test set always contains the test data of the previous one.



































































Figure 3.11: Effectiveness of Imputation. The lower the better.
Fig. 3.11 shows the imputation results on the three datasets. We can clearly see
that our FACETS significantly outperforms others, especially when the percentage of the
missing values is large. Fig. 3.12 presents a trip instance from our FACETS’s imputation
results of SPMD. The x-axis and y-axis denote the normalized latitude and longitude,
respectively. In each figure, the blue cross line represents the training data and the red
line is the recovered trace from the FACETS algorithm. As we can see, FACETS achieves
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good approximations with few training data (90% - 10%). Even with only 1% training
data (i.e., 6 pairs of x-y coordinates), our algorithm also achieves good performance as
shown in Fig. 3.12(d).





























(a) 90% training data





























(b) 50% training data





























(c) 10% training data





























(d) 1% training data
Figure 3.12: FACETS’s Imputation Results of One Trip Instance in SPMD
Fig. 3.13 shows the prediction results of all the algorithms on the three datasets.
For the evaluations on the SST dataset and the Motes dataset, we train the models using
the first k time steps of time series, where k = bT ∗ (1− prediction%)c. For the SPMD
data, the most common scenario is to predict the trace of a target trip based on completed
trips in history. Therefore, to evaluate the prediction effectiveness for the SPMD dataset,
we randomly select several trips (i.e., prediction% among all the trips included in the
experiments), and predict their last prediction% time steps. As we can see, our FACETS
algorithm is quite robust for different prediction ratios, ranging from 10% to 40%. Our
FACETS algorithm and its special case DCMF achieve much higher accuracy than oth-
ers. Fig. 3.14 demonstrates FACETS’s prediction results on two sensor instances from the
Motes dataset.
3.5.3.4 Efficiency Results
We test the scalability of the FACETS algorithm on a number of subsets of the Motes
dataset and the SPMD dataset. As Fig. 3.15(a) shows, our proposed FACETS algorithm
scales linearly w.r.t. the sequence length T , which is consistent with our complexity anal-
ysis in section 3.5.2. Fig. 3.15(b) demonstrates that the running time of FACETS is close
to linear w.r.t. the aggregated dimensions n of time series.
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Figure 3.13: Effectiveness of Prediction. The lower the better.
























































































































Figure 3.14: FACETS’s Prediction for Sensor 30 and Sensor 54 in Motes
We compare the running time of our FACETS algorithm with other baselines shown
in Fig. 3.16. Fig. 3.16(a) presents the running time of the imputation experiments on
the SST dataset. Combining with the results of Fig. 3.11(a), we can see that FACETS
and DCMF yield superior effectiveness while they spend much less time in comparison
with PMF, SoRec, SmoothPMF and SmoothSoRec. We can get similar observations from
Fig. 3.16(b), which presents the running time of the prediction experiments on the SPMD
dataset.
3.6 Related Work
One group of related work is time series mining [44], including representation [66,
74], classification [35,40,85], outlier detection [53] and etc. For instance, [40] proposed a
voting framework for multi-dimensional time series classification by weighting the class
prediction from each time series stream. [74] presented a multi-resolution symbolic repre-
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Figure 3.15: Scalability of our FACETS algorithm































(a) Imputation on SST






























(b) Prediction on SPMD
Figure 3.16: Efficiency of our FACETS algorithm
sentation to index time series datasets for fast exact search and approximate search. [35]
used an ensemble of models for mining data streams with concept-drifting and skewed
distributions. [54] proposed a linear dynamic system based approach to infer the miss-
ing values from multiple time series. [61] combined a multi-level chain model and a cost
model to find typical patterns and meaningful segments in multiple time series.
Another group of related work is the matrix factorization methods used in the rec-
ommendation systems [51, 58, 63, 76], which aim to find low-rank latent factors to rep-
resent users and items. The factors can be fit into the user-item rating matrix and can be
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further used to make rating predictions. For example, [63] proposed a linear probabilis-
tic model of matrix factorization, which scales linearly with the number of observations
and performs well on large and sparse datasets. [58, 84] integrated the user social net-
work and/or the item-item similarity with the user-item matrix in the probabilistic factor
analysis. Dynamic matrix factorization methods have been proposed to capture the evolv-
ing user preferences [30, 76]. [76] built a dynamic state space model upon probabilistic
matrix factorization to track the temporal dynamics of the user latent factor. [30] applied
non-negative matrix factorization on linear dynamic systems, to model evolving user pref-
erences on the user-item adoption problem.
Tensor decompositions have been successfully applied in many domains including
signal processing, computer vision, neuroscience and data mining [49]. If we treat the
time dimension as an additional temporal mode, a group of tensor compositions can be
applied, such as tucker decomposition [78], canonical/parrallel-factors (CP) decomposi-
tion [24,37], and multilinear PCA [57]. [75] formally introduced tensors in time-evolving
settings and proposed dynamic and streaming tensor analysis, which learned a latent, low-
dimensional core tensor and a set of projection matrices so as to summarize large tensor
sequences and detect patterns. [82] extended two-dimensional collaborative filter prob-
lems into a three-order tensor after introducing the time factor. They proposed a bayesian
probabilistic tensor factorization method to compute CP decompositions to get the latent
factors in each mode. Rogers et al. [71] presented multilinear dynamical systems to model
tensor time series based on linear dynamic systems.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we studied how to effectively and efficiently mine multiple coevolv-
ing time series. We identified and summarized three critical challenges of mining time
series data. Our main contributions are
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• we introduced novel settings on mining a network of coevolving time series.
• to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to collectively address all the three
challenges on mining time series data.
• we proposed two effective and efficient algorithms: the DCMF algorithm for NoT,
and the FACETS algorithm for Net-HiTs; and analyze their effectiveness, complex-
ity and the relationship with the existing tools.
• our extensive experiments on several real datasets demonstrated the effectiveness
and scalability of the proposed methods. For effectiveness, our methods outperform
the existing state-of-the-arts algorithms, especially when there are lots of missing
values. For scalability, our methods enjoy a linear scalability w.r.t. the length of
time series. Our methods achieve superior effectiveness while they spend much
less time in comparison with other methods.
CHAPTER 4
Conclusions and Future Directions
This thesis is dedicated to address the challenges in wireless network measurement and
management. We studied the impact introduced by the characteristics of wireless local
area network on network forensics and home security monitoring (Chapter 2). We out-
lined a wireless forensic monitoring system (SMoWF) to collect trace digests of WiFi
activities and facilitate cybercrime investigation (Chapter 2.2). We designed a low-cost
home security system (Beagle) for physical intruder detection utilizing WiFi networks
(Chapter 2.3). Then, we studied how to effectively and efficiently model multiple coe-
volving time series, which is ubiquitous in network measurement, especially in sensor
networks. We proposed two effective and scalable algorithms: the DCMF algorithm for
multiple coevolving time series, and the FACETS algorithm for high-order coevolving
time series (Chapter 3). Our experiments demonstrated that our algorithms outperform
existing state-of-the-arts algorithms and enjoy a linear scalability w.r.t. the length of time
series.
As the advancement of network measurement infrastructures in wireless networks,
more and more data are generated and gathered from mobile devices, sensor networks,
radio-frequency identification readers, etc. It further brings up more challenges in man-
aging and understanding these data. We summarize several directions for future work.
• Diverse applications. As we see from Section 3.2, there are many common appli-
cations in mining time series data. In this thesis, we already present that the two
proposed models work effectively in imputation and prediction. Next step is to




• Incrementally learning. Time series data usually comes in a streaming way. For ex-
ample, in environmental monitoring, sensor nodes continuously generate the moni-
tored measurements; in network traffic analysis, network nodes periodically collect
traffic statistics; in financial data analysis, numerous trades and quotes are gener-
ated every second. It is very challenging to incrementally learn streaming coevolv-
ing time series, especially when the underlying settings of the nodes generated these
time series are changing.
• Temporal dynamics and network dynamics. In the setting of our two algorithms, we
assume a linear correlation between two adjacent time series data and we assume
the contextual networks embedded in time series are static. In some applications,
neither of the two assumptions might be valid. The temporal correlation might
be non-linear. The contextual networks might be changed at some time step. We
would like to capture these dynamics in our models.
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